argue, however, that the trial judge erred by not giving a sharp
warning about credibility problems with Starr’s testimony.
 We would not give effect to these grounds of appeal.
( i) The threshold reliability challenge
 Although the trial judge admitted the evidence under the
principled exception to the hearsay rule, both the proposed evidence and the hearsay statements that were ultimately presented
would satisfy the “state of mind” exception relied upon by the
Crown. This is enough, in the circumstances, to demonstrate that
the threshold “indicia of reliability” requirements of the principled exception were met. We will explain.
 In Starr, at para. 168, Iacobucci J., for the majority, quoted
R. v. Smith,  2 S.C.R. 915,  S.C.J. No. 74, at p. 925
S.C.R. stating that an “exception to the hearsay rule arises when
the declarant’s statement is adduced in order to demonstrate the
intentions, or state of mind, of the declarant at the time when the
statement was made”. He endorsed the conditions for this exception expressed in J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in trials at common
law, revised ed. by J.H. Chadbourn (Boston: Little Brown, 1976),
vol. 6, at para. 1725, p. 129, that the statement must “be of
a present existing state of mind, and must appear to have been
made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion” (emphasis in original). Naturally, the present state of mind
of the declarant must also be relevant to the proceedings: R. v. C.
(M.),  O.J. No. 3959, 2014 ONCA 611, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 336,
at para. 63.
 Each of these requirements is met in this case.
 The statements attributed to McQuhae purport to narrate
his present state of mind — fear that he would be killed by the
appellant, or fear because he was at the top of the appellant’s
 The trial judge found that the proposed statements
appeared to have been made without leading questions or improper influence, or in contemplation of any legal proceedings. In
other words, the statements were made in a natural manner.
 In Starr, at para. 178, the ante-mortem statement of the
deceased that he intended to go to meet the accused was made
in circumstances of suspicion, namely, the prospect that the
deceased lied to his girlfriend about his present intention to cover
up his actual intention to see another woman. No such circumstances of suspicion attend McQuhae’s statements concerning his
state of mind of fear.
 And, as in R. v. Griffin,  2 S.C.R. 42,  S.C.J. No.
28, 2009 SCC 28, at para. 63, the deceased’s fear of the appellant