So what position would the decedent have to be in in order to only get [blood]
stains on the sleeves and on the inner part of the — the shirt and not basically anywhere else in the scene other than that pooling position?
I did some experimentation using a model that was the same height as our
decedent and went through basic scenarios. So in order to expose both sleeves
and the inner portion of both the left and right panels of the shirt, the only
way that would make sense . . . is if the shirt and wearer are in some sort of
prone position; bent over.
[T]he theory was that the person was in this or a similar position for a period
of time while bleeding. It’s the only position that accounts for the staining
we’re seeing at the scene and the staining we’re seeing on both the — the
pants and shirt of the decedent.
 The photographs were demonstrative evidence, helpful in
understanding and evaluating this testimony. They illustrated the
analyst’s observations and conclusions as to the position of the
deceased when he was stabbed in a more effective way than
a simple verbal description would have done.
 The trial judge’s instructions to the jury appropriately
guarded against prejudicial effect, to the extent there was any. He
advised the jury that the photographs and reports filed as exhibits
were only as good as the evidence on which they were based, and
that in deciding how much or little to rely on them, the jury
should consider not only how they were prepared, but also the
evidence on which they were based. The trial judge did not err
either in admitting the photographs, or in his instructions to the
jury on how the photographs should be used.
Issue 4: Did the trial judge err in law in failing to properly
charge the jury on the elements of self-defence?
 The appellant submits that, even though both the Crown
and defence requested a charge on both ss. 34(1) and 34(2) [of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46], the trial judge erred in
charging on s. 34(1). He submits that, because the appellant
admitted to intentionally stabbing McQuhae as a proportionate
response to a deadly situation, a prima facie case had been made
out that the appellant likely intended to cause significant bodily
harm. That should have disqualified s. 34(1).
 He further submits that the s. 34(1) charge was wrong. He
argues the jury should have been instructed that the appellant
could have used force to repel McQuhae’s attack if he did not
intend to cause death or grievous bodily harm, so long as he used