limit is $50,000 for individuals who sustain an injury outside
the minor injury guideline and $1 million for those who suffer a catastrophic injury;
— attendant care benefits will not be paid for more than 104
weeks after an accident unless the injured party suffers
a catastrophic injury;
— housekeeping benefits are available for up to $100 per week
for insureds having a catastrophic injury.
The Parties’ Positions
 The plaintiff submits that the claims articulated at para.
1(a)( v) a.–f. of the proposed amended claim are captured by the
broad language in the original claim: “medical and rehabilitation
benefits . . . including but not limited to . . . ”.
 Similarly, he suggests the catastrophic designation falls
within the expansive words at paras. 1(a)( iv), (b) and 12, which
specifically reference attendant care benefits, and future and
ongoing benefits. The claim for future attendant care benefits is
said to necessarily imply a claim for a catastrophic designation.
He also makes the point that the claim for punitive damages
involves an examination of the insurer’s conduct throughout the
entire claims process, including after the Act was amended. Thus,
the catastrophic designation and other claims necessarily arise
from the claim for punitive damages.
 The defendant submits that the amendments are properly
characterized as new disputes. The transition provisions do not
contemplate amendments being made to a claim to add post-transition claims or disputes. Moreover, the issue of catastrophic
impairment is not raised in a pleading simply because a claim for
ongoing accident benefits is advanced.
 Further, a determination of CAT impairment is not
a SAB. The designation is simply a prerequisite to eligibility for
attendant care or medical and rehabilitation benefits at an
enhanced level, as well as to housekeeping benefits. So, for example, a CAT designation enables an insured to access medical and
rehabilitation in excess of $50,000, which, as noted above, are the
 The defendant submits that the transition rules signal the
legislature’s clear intent to eliminate an insured’s ability to challenge post-transition disputes through a lawsuit.
 It further urges that even if there is a gap in the transition
rules, it is not for the court to fill it. Finally, it says that Rule 26
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, which
makes legally tenable pleading amendments mandatory, absent