I have come to the conclusion that the motion must be
permitted. I do not agree with the defendant that the legislature’s
failure to deal with the amendment of an existing claim was
deliberate. It was more likely an oversight, given that the result is
the bifurcation of issues and the requirement for two parallel
proceedings through two different forums. This results in a multiplicity of proceedings, contrary to the important policy expressed
in the Courts of Justice Act.
 Nevertheless, it is not necessary (or, admittedly, open) for
the court to fill that gap.
 I agree with both decisions referenced above. In the
Lucas-Logan, the proposed amendments very clearly advanced claims
that arose after the amendment and they were in no way implicit
in the original pleading.
 In contrast, in Charway, the language used in the original
claim clearly contemplated the claims that were simply being
more fully particularized in the proposed amendment.
 Here, read with a generous eye, I conclude that the proposed amendments are simply a particularization of claims
advanced in the original claim. They are not new disputes. I recognize that the specifically quantified medical and rehabilitation
benefits claimed in the original pleading pre-date the statutory
amendment. The amendments sought all arose after that time.
 However, at para. 12, the original pleading advances a claim
for future and ongoing benefits, which is sufficiently broadly worded to include post-amendment claims. And para. 1 makes it clear
that the claim includes but is not limited to those articulated.
 More significant, however, is that the OCF-19 was completed and submitted before the amendment to the Act. Consequently, the insurer had notice of the claim. Unfortunately, the
assessments and denial did not occur until post-amendment,
something that was within the insurer’s control. It was no longer
open to the insured to dispute the decision through mediation
because that avenue was foreclosed by the statutory amendment.
 Paragraph 11 of the original claim makes the point
that the full particulars of the claims are within the insurer’s
knowledge. Further particulars are promised before or at trial.
The implication is that claims until the time of trial are contemplated. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that this pleading is
sufficiently broad to include post-amendment claims.
 Finally, I am satisfied that the language of the statutory
amendment itself is properly interpreted to permit the amendments sought.