raises the important issues of procedural fairness and due process
before the Board and of the adequacy of the Board’s rules, procedures and practices with respect to parties who wish to represent
themselves at a hearing before the Board.
 R.C., who is a self-represented litigate, appeared to argue
the appeal, and he wished the appeal to be heard and not dismissed as moot, but it was amicus curiae who raised the matter
of the policies and practices of the Board and whether R.C. had
been afforded due process and procedural fairness.
 Amicus curiae submitted that after R.C. exercised his choice
to represent himself at the hearing, the Board erred by
allowed the hearing to continue without appointing an amicus
curiae to assist the Board and without providing sufficient
direction and assistance to R.C. to ensure that he received a fair
 As I shall also explain below, the Board did err and R.C. did
not receive a procedurally fair hearing. Therefore, R.C.’s appeal
should succeed to the extent of setting aside the Board’s decision.
No other relief is required.
 In the interest of protecting his privacy, I order an amendment to the style of cause to remove reference to R.C.’s proper
name and I substitute initials.
B. Procedural Background: R.C.’s Proceedings before the Board
 On July 6, 2017, pursuant to the Mental Health Act,2 R.C.
was involuntarily admitted to CAMH (the Centre for Addiction
and Mental Health). He had been brought to the hospital as
a result of proceedings initiated by his sister. He was admitted,
and Dr. Klukach was his attending psychiatrist.
 Dr. Klukach found R.C. incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.
 R.C. challenged both the involuntary admission and the
finding of incapacity.
 A hearing before the Board was convened on July 20, 2017.
On July 20, 2017, R.C. was represented by D’Arcy J. Hiltz, a very
experienced counsel at Board hearings. The hearing, however,
at the request of Dr. Klukach, was adjourned to July 26, 2017.
 On July 26, 2017, the hearing resumed and Mr. Hiltz again
represented R.C. There was a preliminary motion with respect to
R.C.’s involuntary patient status, but the matter of R.C.’s consent
2 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7.