Board erred in determining the scope of procedural fairness in
the immediate case.
 I agree that in the circumstances of the immediate case
that the Board erred in administering its Rules of Practice and
in determining the scope of procedural fairness, but I would
explain the Board’s error somewhat differently than amicus
curiae because, in my opinion, the Board did not fail in offering
assistance to R.C. as an unrepresented party, which is part of the
 The Board did take a proactive role and, among other
actions, it did instruct and assist R.C. throughout the hearing
while ensuring fairness to Dr. Klukach. The Board did accommodate R.C.’s lack of familiarity with the process while respecting
the rights of the other parties. The Board appears to have proceeded in accordance with its Rules and with Guideline No. 2,
which explains what the Board should do when a party decides to
represent himself or herself.
 However, in my opinion, in determining the scope of procedural fairness, the Board erred and its decision was not correct
and is subject to appellate review. The Board erred by misconstruing the nature of R.C.’s constitutional right to discharge Mr. Hirtz
as his representative and to represent himself. More precisely, in
circumstances where R.C. had made an informed decision to represent himself, the Board erred in construing the exercise of
R.C.’s rights as precluding the appointment of an amicus curiae
to assist the Board.
 In my opinion, in no circumstance is the Board precluded
from appointing an amicus curiae, if that is what is required for
the proceeding before the Board to be conducted in a procedurally
fair manner. In the immediate case, R.C. was constitutionally
entitled to represent himself regardless of the fact that it was
a virtual certainty that he would not be an effective advocate. But
that entitlement did not preclude the Board from discharging
Mr. Hirtz as R.C.’s legal representative but then appointing him
amicus curiae to complete the hearing on August 10, 2017.
 In my opinion, what the Board ought to have done is both:
(a) to have assisted R.C. as a self-represented litigate, which the
Board did do; and also, (b) to have appointed Mr. Hirtz amicus
curiae to assist the Board, which the Board did not do. The hearing before the Board ought to have proceeded much like the hearing of this appeal proceeded. I heard R.C.’s submissions, which
were largely unintelligible and unhelpful, and then I heard the
helpful submissions of amicus curiae and Dr. Klukach’s counsel.
 A party’s decision to be a self-represented party, be it an
informed decision, an uninformed decision, or a forced decision