(as in the situation where the party cannot obtain legal representation or where the legal representative withdraws from representation) does not preclude the Board from appointing an
amicus curiae to assist the Board. In other words, regardless of
why a party is self-represented, be it a matter of a personal decision or not, the self-represented party should be assisted
throughout the hearing and the Board may also in appropriate
circumstances appoint an amicus curiae to ensure procedural
fairness and due process.
 I now turn to the case law that supports my opinion.
 In R. v. Swain, supra, Swain was charged with assault
and transferred to a psychiatric facility for the criminally
insane. He was given medication, released into the community
and granted bail. At his assault trial, over his objection, the
Crown introduced evidence of insanity at the time of the
offence. The result was that Mr. Swain was found not guilty by
reason of insanity. He was remitted to the psychiatric facility
under a warrant of the Lieutenant Governor, where he was
detained for a period of time until he was released on conditions.
Mr. Swain appealed and advanced several constitutional challenges that eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada,
where the court held that the common law rule permitting the
Crown to adduce evidence of insanity against an accused’s wishes violated s. 7 of the Charter.
 The Swain decision is authority that a person whose liberty or security of the person interest has been deprived is entitled
to be represented by counsel and that person is also entitled to
decide not to be represented by counsel. At paras. 33, 35-36 of his
decision, Chief Justice Lamer, writing for himself and Justices
Sopinka and Cory, stated:25
The appellant argues that it is a principle of fundamental justice that an
accused person be able to participate in a meaningful way in his or her
defence and to make fundamental decisions about the conduct of his or her
defence — such as waiving the defence of insanity. (I pause here to note that
I will use the term “defence” in the broad sense of “any answer which defeats
a criminal charge”; see my reasons for judgment in R. v. Chaulk, 
3 S.C.R. 1303, at p. 1318.) It is argued that the functioning of the adversarial
system is premised on the autonomy of an accused to make fundamental
decisions about his or her defence which require certain consequences and
risks to be weighed. The appellant’s argument is reflected in the words of
Stewart J. in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (Calif. C.A., 1975), at p. 834:
25 Justice Gonthier, writing for himself and Justice La Forest, was in substantial agreement with the reasons of Chief Justice Lamer.