several reasons for reducing the costs order, including sanctioning
the appellants’ counsel for attempting to “trick” the respondents
relating to a settlement offer.
 For the reasons below, we would dismiss the appeal from
the conditional assignment order and deny leave to appeal the
costs order. The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in
granting the conditional assignment order, and there are no
strong grounds for concluding that the trial judge erred in ordering
the costs that he did.
B. The Issues
 The appeal before this court is narrow. Neither the allocation of liability nor the quantum of damages is contested. There
are two general issues.
 The first or main issue is whether the trial judge erred
in assigning to Aviva and Pilot Ms. Carroll’s right to SABs
“in respect of medical and rehabilitation benefits and attendant
care benefits”, provided the judgment is paid in full. Two sub-
(1) Did the trial judge err in law in granting the conditional
assignment where the “jury’s lump sum assessment did not
allow the court to match the award of future care costs to
the particular accident benefits that might be received in the
(2) Did the trial judge err in law in granting the conditional
assignment order prematurely, before the judgment had been
paid in full?
 The second general issue relates to the costs order. The
trial judge reduced the costs order for three reasons, namely,
(1) the behaviour of the appellants’ counsel relating to a September 11, 2015 settlement offer made by the respondents; (2) the
lack of benefit to the appellants in pursuing the trial; and
(3) behaviour by the appellants that extended the trial. The
appellants claim that each of these bases for doing so was in
error, so each must be considered in turn. The threshold question is whether leave to appeal the costs order should be granted
on any or all of these bases. If leave is granted, it must then
be determined whether the trial judge erred in the costs order
1 Revised plaintiffs’ factum, at para. 8.