The appellants also argued that no assignment should take
place as it is unlikely that the judgment will be paid, given the
insurance limits and the McEwens’ bankruptcy.
 The trial judge disagreed. He held [at para. 6] that the
Gilbert principles were satisfied because “it was clear at the trial
that the only major damage issue was the cost of future care”,
and that all of the evidence demonstrated that the nature and
need for future care was [at para. 9] “akin to health benefits”.
(This latter reference is from Bannon, at p. 679 O.R., “a head of
damage or type of loss akin to that for which the no-fault benefits
were intended to compensate”.) The trial judge was not troubled
by the prospect that payment of the judgment may be unlikely,
because the appellants were aware of this risk before commencing
 The trial judge therefore made a conditional s. 267.8(12)(a)( iv)
assignment order in favour of Aviva and Pilot. Specifically, he
ordered that “[u]pon payment” of the said sum of “$2,610,774.32
plus costs and post-judgment interest” the two insurers would be
assigned Ms. Carroll’s entitlement to SABs “in respect of medical
and rehabilitation benefits and attendant care benefits” available
to her “from her own insurer, Pilot . . .”.
(a) The trial judge did not err in his assessment of the
 The appellants contend that a strict matching approach is
justified because language in certain subsections of s. 267.8 links
the benefit payment to the particular damages award. They point
to s. 267.8(1)1 which refers to “the income loss and loss of earning
capacity”, and s. 267.8(4)1, which refers to “the expenses for
health care” (emphasis added). The appellants claim these are
references to benefits in respect of “the tort award”, which direct
strict identification and matching between particular SABs and
damages for the identical head of damages awarded by the jury
within the same silo. They suggest that although the trust and
assignment provisions do not similarly include the word “the”,
those provisions should be interpreted in the same way to achieve
consistency in interpretation and application.
 The appellants assert that because the assignment provisions are a codification of common law “Cox and Carter” orders,
the general principles articulated in Bannon remain applicable.
 They argue that, in this case, the strict matching requirement cannot be satisfied because the jury award for “future care
costs” was not particularized. They also argue that the future