In support, the appellants rely on the fact that the offer
was drafted using the style of cause of the accident damages
action and used the language from Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
49, referring to an “offer to settle this proceeding”. Moreover,
by clear implication counsel for Aviva and Pilot represented in its
September 11, 2015 letter that this was a Rule 49 offer, which
would necessarily require that the offer not extend beyond claims
brought in the proceeding.
 In our view, the trial judge’s findings that underpin his
characterization of the appellants’ conduct as a trick deserve deference. The prior offers and the trial record, including the e-mail
of September 10, 2015, provide ample basis for the trial judge’s
conclusion [at para. 34] that “without doubt . . . all these offers
were made on the basis that everything would be settled between
these parties and this would end all litigation”, and that the
appellants knew this. The trial judge clearly understood the technical foundation that the appellants’ counsel was relying on to
support its claim that it was accepting an offer to settle only the
accident damages action, and he was entitled, on the evidence before him, to reject the bona fides of that claim. Based on those
findings of fact, the attempt by the appellants to enforce the settlement could be characterized as a trick. A settlement is based
on a meeting of the minds, yet the appellants, knowing that no
meeting of the minds had occurred, attempted to enforce the purported settlement. The trial judge was entitled to find that the
relative timing of the acceptance of the offer and of the service of
the bad faith statement of claim smacked of a calculated design to
entrap the respondents into a settlement the appellants knew had
not been achieved. No error of principle occurred in this case. The
reduction of the costs award by the trial judge was warranted by
the conduct he found.
 The appellants are also critical of the trial judge for stating
that the reasons of Hackland J. on the enforcement motion were
before the court, when no such reasons had ever been issued.
Nothing comes of this. The trial judge simply misspoke. It is obvious he was referring to the colloquy between Hackland J. and the
appellants’ counsel during the motion where Hackland J. was
critical of the conduct of the appellants’ counsel.
 Nor does it matter that Hackland J.’s position on the
impropriety of the appellants’ counsel’s conduct softened by the
end of the settlement enforcement motion. What matters is the
trial judge’s characterization of the appellants’ conduct, and that
his characterization was amply supported by the record.