(2) The lack of material benefit
 The trial judge also found that costs should be reduced
because, given the offer of September 11, 2015 in particular, the
benefits to the appellants in proceeding to trial “were slight”.
In essence, the trial judge was critical of the appellants for needlessly forcing a trial.
 The appellants claim that this conclusion by the trial judge
represents a palpable and overriding error. They urge that, on the
evidence, they beat the offers to settle that were made. They also
argue that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the offers
the appellants made, and by requiring the appellants to beat the
offers to settle by a substantial margin in order to secure partial
indemnity costs. This last submission arises from the trial judge’s
observation [at para. 45] that “it seems that the verdict’s benefit
to the [appellants] is not substantially over the offers themselves
as these offers really comprised the funds available”. We do not
accept any of these arguments.
 The trial judge considered the settlement offers that had
been made, and the appellants’ position. He was simply persuaded by the respondents’ position that, while it may appear factually that the settlement offers had been beaten, when substance is
considered there was little if anything to be gained by going to
trial. When the trial judge said that the appellants had not
substantially beaten the offers made, he was not purporting to
describe and apply a legal principle. He was commenting on the
state of facts.
 The trial judge was entitled, in the circumstances, to conclude that there was little if any benefit in bringing the action.
Regardless of the jury award, the most the appellants could realize in damages after trial was $2 million, the gross amount of
available insurance coverage. The McEwens were discharged
bankrupts and the permission the appellants secured to sue them
was limited to their $1 million insurance policy.
 Nor is it clear that the appellants beat the offers by any
measure. The $2,150,000 September 11, 2015 offer made by the
respondents did not include an assignment of future SABs, and
therefore, in substance, was an offer worth well in excess of
$2,150,000 to the appellants. On the evidence before the trial
judge, the value of the future SABs was between $599,000
and $830,000. After the multi-week trial, the appellants secured
an award of $2,610,774.32 in damages, as well as costs of
$375,000. There was little if any utility in having a trial. In
our view, the trial judge was entitled to rely on this to reduce
the costs order.