A Preliminary Issue: The Availability of Certiorari
 While this judgment was under reserve, the Supreme
Court of Canada released its decisions in R. v. Gubbins, 
S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44 and R. v. Awashish,  S.C.J. No.
45, 2018 SCC 45. We invited and received written submissions
from the parties and intervenor on the effect, if any,
of those decisions on the issues raised in this appeal. I have
considered those submissions, in addition to those contained
in the factums and raised in oral argument in reaching my
 The appellants invoked the extraordinary remedy jurisdiction of the motion judge to challenge the disclosure ruling made
by the trial judge. None of the parties made any submissions to
the motion judge about the availability of certiorari as a remedy
to challenge the correctness of the trial judge’s disclosure order.
Nor did the parties or intervenor question the appellants’ remedy
choice in oral argument in this court.
 To be faithful to the teachings of Awashish, it becomes
necessary to consider first whether the remedy sought by the
appellants — certiorari with prohibition in aid — could be
invoked as a basis on which to set aside the disclosure order made
by the trial judge.
The positions of the parties
 In his written submissions, Crown counsel acknowledged
that certiorari was not available to challenge the trial judge’s
finding that the rolling logs were relevant or that their disclosure
was governed by the first party disclosure regime of Stinchcombe.
In each instance, the Crown recognizes, even if the trial judge
were wrong, the error was an error of law within the jurisdiction
of the trial judge, not a jurisdictional error.
 On the other hand, the Crown contends, the trial judge’s
purported “exemption” of the parties from the disclosure prohibition in s. 258.1(2) of the Criminal Code amounts to jurisdictional
error. This is because, under Awashish, a failure to follow a mandatory statutory provision is a jurisdictional error.
 At all events, the Crown argued, because the OPP had
third-party standing to seek certiorari, the Crown was also entitled to advance arguments before the motion judge as a party affected by the decision. The OPP says that as a third party — the
record holder — it was entitled to invoke certiorari to correct errors of law on the face of the record. Those errors, according to
the OPP, consisted of the trial judge’s findings that
( i) the rolling logs were relevant;