Recall at the outset that no party contested the availability
of certiorari as a mechanism to review the disclosure order made
by the trial judge. Not before the motion judge. And not in this
court, as the appeal was argued.
 On the other hand, as Awashish confirms, the availability
of certiorari as a mechanism for parties to challenge pre-trial
rulings is significantly circumscribed. That neither party challenged its availability cannot overcome those restrictions.
 The Crown accepts that it generally cannot invoke
certiorari to review a disclosure order made in provincial court proceedings to which it is a party. This shields from interlocutory review
the provincial court’s determination that the disclosure request is
governed by the first party regime of Stinchcombe rather than the
third party procedure of O’Connor. A trial judge has the jurisdiction to make these decisions. Jurisdiction is a matter of adjudicative authority, not correctness of the decision rendered.
 However, the decision in Awashish does allow a party
access to certiorari for jurisdictional error. And jurisdictional
error includes failure to observe a mandatory provision of the
Criminal Code or a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Here, the Crown alleges that the trial judge failed to give effect to
the Criminal Code prohibition against the use or disclosure of
evaluation results save in exceptional circumstances, a prohibition reinforced by the creation of a summary conviction offence
for improper disclosure. The effect of this error, the Crown
argues, amounts to a failure to observe a mandatory provision of
the Criminal Code, and thus permits access to certiorari in
accordance with an exception recognized by Awashish. This allegation is sufficient to place the issue of the provincial court
judge’s jurisdiction before the superior court by way of certiorari.
 As a third party record holder, the OPP was also able to
challenge the trial judge’ jurisdiction on certiorari. Therefore, I
am satisfied that this is not a case in which access to certiorari
was foreclosed by the prohibition against interlocutory appeals
laid down by Awashish.2
2 However, the scope of permissible arguments on certiorari may have been more
limited than was allowed by the motion judge in this case. A third party record-holder is generally entitled to challenge the disclosure order even for errors of
law on the face of the record within the trial judge’s jurisdiction. However, the
interests of the OPP in this case are closely aligned with those of the Crown, as
evidenced by the fact that the OPP has relied heavily on the Crown’s
arguments in this appeal. Whether a third party whose interests are well
represented by a first party should also have expanded access to certiorari
was not an issue argued before this court. I would only note that, as a practical matter, the OPP’s expanded third-party standing has allowed the