I am in agreement with the above sentiment that costs are
those of the party and not the solicitor, or in this case the class.
 A finding that the representative plaintiff, in this case
Trillium, has an unencumbered right to costs would also preserve
the integrity of the retainer agreement. Trillium cannot give
what it does not have. If the proprietary interest in costs was split
between all the class members it would create additional confusion for both future class counsel and representative plaintiffs.
Trillium has agreed to assign the costs award to class counsel
and, in my view, cannot now assert that the retainer agreement
speaks to something else.
 I therefore conclude that the costs award is the property of
Trillium and forms part of its estate in bankruptcy.
Class counsel’s interest in the costs award has priority
 I should start by stating that GM concedes that it has no
claim over the 20 per cent of the judgment amount and interest
being claimed by class counsel. GM restricts its claim solely to the
costs award that Trillium obtained from Cassels.
 GM, supported by FTI, submits that its security under the
PPSA gives it priority to class counsel for the costs award. FTI
made the primary submissions on this issue.
 I disagree with those submissions.
 Again, this is essentially a contest between the security
granted under the PPSA and the security granted under the CPA.
There are no cases directly on point.
 FTI submits that the “first in time” rules under the PPSA
apply to the CPA charge and the CPA charge, which I have granted,
is subordinated to the prior perfected secured creditor, GM.
 In this regard, FTI relies upon s. 4 of the PPSA which
provides as follows:
Non-application of Act
4(1) Except as otherwise provided under this Act, this Act does not apply,
(a) to a lien given by statute or rule of law, except as provided in sub-
clause 20(1)(a)( i) or section 31[.]
 FTI submits that the first charge provided by the CPA is
not a lien in the relevant sense of s. 4(1)(a) of the PPSA.
 As a result, FTI further submits that s. 20(1)(a)( ii) of the
PPSA specifically provides that, until perfected, a security interest
in collateral is subordinate to the interest of a person who causes
the collateral to be seized through a charging order but, once
perfected, the security interest is not subordinate to a seizure