Charging orders exist alongside, and in addition to, a court’s inherent
jurisdiction to grant a solicitor’s lien. Although distinct, they are two sides of
the same coin, and overlap significantly in purpose and effect . . .
In our view, the conceptual differences between the two orders, such as how
and when they are acquired, do not justify the application of different tests.
The two types of charges cover the same circumstances and have identical
 There seems to remain no meaningful distinction, for the
purposes of this application, at least, between a solicitor’s lien in
the common law and by virtue of statute. It is my view, in light of
Court of Appeal’s dictum in Hislop that the first charge provided
for in the CPA is “essentially a solicitor’s lien”, that the CPA first
charge overlaps significantly with solicitor’s liens in terms of
purpose and effect. It is also appropriate to adopt a broad, purposeful approach in interpreting the CPA: Jeffery v. London Life
Insurance Co.,  O.J. No. 4465, 2018 ONCA 716, at para. 44.
 I see no equitable concerns that are substantial enough to
displace such a broad approach. GM submits in this regard that
since class counsel chose Trillium to be its representative
defendant, it has to live with the consequences of Trillium insolvency. As I discussed above, GM also raises the spectre that the
selection of Trillium was a tactical decision to frustrate creditors.
 I disagree for two reasons.
 First, there is no evidence that a tactical decision was
made by class counsel. Furthermore, in the circumstances of this
class action litigation, it is difficult to accept that any proposed
representative plaintiff would have been solvent as a result of the
actions of GM which closed all of the class members’ car dealerships.
 Second, GM had the opportunity to seek security for costs
or to seek costs from a non-party. GM did so at the outset and
obtained an order for security for costs, but then did not renew its
request for additional security for costs until this matter was
before the Court of Appeal at which time the motion was
dismissed. In determining the motion, reported as Trillium Motor
World Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd.,  O.J. No.
4939, 2016 ONCA 702, Huscroft J.A. commented, at para. 34:
GM’s decision not to bring a motion for security for costs was made for tacti-
cal reasons. At the hearing of the motion, GM stated candidly that it did not
bring a motion earlier because it was not willing to expose its people to cross-
examination. That was GM’s choice, and GM must bear the burden of that
choice. It would be inappropriate for this court to relieve GM of the conse-
quences of its tactical decisions.
Huscroft J.A. also noted, at paras. 27-29, that GM took no steps to
replace Trillium as the representative plaintiff.