I am therefore of the view that the CPA first charge
should be viewed as a lien for the purposes of the priority dispute with the PPSA and that, pursuant to s. 4(1)(a), the PPSA
does not apply.
 This conclusion is bolstered by the decision in Dalcor Inc.
v. Unimac Group Ltd. (2017), 136 O.R. (3d) 585,  O.J. No.
567, 2017 ONSC 945 (S.C.J.), in which Sutherland J., at paras. 32,
33 and 34, held:
If the legislature intended to interfere with the common law, law of equity or
statutory right of a solicitor’s charging order, it would have provided explicit
language that it intended to do so. Absent such explicit language, it is pre-
sumed that the legislature did not intend to interfere with the common law,
law of equity or statutory right to solicitors’ charging orders.
The ordinary wording of the PPSA gives different consequences to liens and
charging orders. The wording is contradictory in that liens are excluded under
section 4(1) of the PPSA but charging orders are not. This contradictory
wording makes it difficult to ascertain the intention of the legislature that,
specifically, solicitors’ charging orders, encompassing a lien component and
statutory charging order component, are subject to a perfected security under
the PPSA. It does not make logical sense to me that the legislature intended
that the statutory charging order component of solicitors’ charging orders is
subject to the provisions of the PPSA but the lien component of a charging
order is not. It seems to me that this could lead to an unjust and inequitable
result, where one element being the lien component has a greater priority
than that of the other element, the statutory component.
Consequently, to extinguish the inchoate right of solicitors’ charging orders
requires, in my opinion, explicit wording from the legislature. No such
wording exits in the PPSA. It is therefore my conclusion that the PPSA does
not include solicitors’ charging orders and as such, a perfected PPSA security
does not have priority over a solicitor’s charging order.
 I also consider my conclusion to be in keeping with
scholarly opinions on the application of s. 4(1)(a) of the PPSA.
Professor Jacob Ziegel and David Denomme have written that the
PPSA “only applies to consensual security interests” and that the
essential characteristic of interests governed by the PPSA is their
origin in an agreement between the parties: The Ontario Personal
Property Security Act Commentary and Analysis, 2nd ed. (Toronto
and Vancouver: Butterworths, 2000), at 78-79. Class counsel rely
on an interest originating in the CPA, not an agreement between
the parties. Professor Ziegel and Mr. Denomme also provide a helpful discussion on the definition of “lien” in s. 4(1)(a) of the PPSA:
The term “lien” is not a term of art. In determining whether a particular lien
is excluded from the [PPSA], the emphasis should be on the lien’s non-consensual character, whether arising by statute or rule of law, and not on the
precise content of the lien in question. “Lien” was defined in an early Ontario
case as meaning, “the right of a person having possession of the property of
another to retain it until some charge upon it or some demand due to him is
satisfied.” This definition has been overtaken by events, since it is common