for modern statutes to create non-possessory as well as possessory liens
(particularly in taxation legislation) and to couple them with the right to
seize and dispose of the collateral.
 In my view, the CPA first charge fits comfortably within
the language of the PPSA. I am not persuaded by the arguments
raised by GM and FTI which sought to restrict or distinguish the
meaning of the words “first charge”.
 First, I do not accept the argument that, because the
common law would have considered contingency fees champertous, class counsel should not obtain the benefit of the development in the law of solicitor’s liens. In my view, such an analysis is
out of touch with the realities of modern practice and the development of the case law, and would subvert class proceedings.
Counsel would be understandably reticent to advance claims on
behalf of impecunious litigants.
 Second, I do not accept the argument that Dalcor is meaningfully distinguishable. Counsel for FTI submits that the
“double aspect” of the charge granted under the Solicitors Act,
i.e., its having both a statutory and common law aspect, does not
apply to first charges under s. 32(3) of the CPA.
 In Dalcor, at para. 30, Sutherland J. found two aspects to
a charging order because “a solicitor’s charging order encom-passes a statutory order and a charging lien, a declaratory order
under the common law and law of equity”. It was the second
aspect that was determinative in Dalcor: “[t]he charging lien
aspect of a charging order . . . takes it out of the explicit wording
of the PPSA”. FTI contends that a CPA first charge has no
declaratory aspect because the common law is not applicable to this
“pure creature of statute” and therefore the PPSA does apply.
 It is true that the CPA is a statutory regime which codifies
procedures which would not have been recognized under the
common law. It is not clear, however, that the law of equity does
not apply with equal force to the CPA first charge provisions and
require that they take on a declaratory aspect. Sutherland J. noted,
at para. 45 of Dalcor, that the unique purpose of a solicitors’
charging order was “to protect solicitors’ services and to encourage and facilitate legal representation of persons who cannot
necessarily afford to pay for legal services as these services are
 These concerns are the same that are embodied by the
CPA. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in Hislop, recognized this
affinity when it said that the CPA first charge was “essentially a
solicitor’s lien”. Since it seems reasonable to characterize a CPA
first charge as a declaratory order under the law of equity at
least, it is unclear how the common law’s historical antipathy to