was delivered after the motion judge’s decision in this matter was
heard but prior to the release of the motion judge’s reasons. It
was not considered by the motion judge.
 In Pepper, at para. 1, the court relied on the fact that the
insured seeking long-term disability benefits “had a cause of
action against [the insurer] . . . and . . . retained litigation counsel
[at the outset] to deal with his claim for disability benefits. This
fact belies any suggestion of a lack of awareness of the appropri-
ateness of commencing a lawsuit at that point in time.”
 The court went on to hold that the fact that there was no
“formal appeal process” meant it would have been prudent to
treat the time the insurer stopped paying disability benefits as
the commencement date for the running of the limitation period
as, in their words, there was a fully ripened claim: paras. 2 and 4-6.
 Pepper is distinguishable from the case before us as, unlike
the claimant in Pepper, Ms. Penttila did not retain litigation
counsel at the outset to deal with her claim for disability benefits.
Retaining a lawyer may be material to the determination of when
a claim is discovered.
 In Nasr Hospitality Services Inc. v. Intact Insurance
(2018), 142 O.R. (3d) 561,  O.J. No. 4514, 2018 ONCA 725,
 I.L.R. 1-5984, the court addressed the issue of the application of the “appropriate means” element of the discoverability
test pursuant to s. 5(1)(a)( iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.
 On January 31, 2013, the plaintiff Nasr’s business was
flooded and Nasr sought coverage for losses caused by the
water damage. Cheques were written to cover damages for
business interruption, rent and hydro. Thereafter the parties
engaged in settlement discussions. On July 22, 2013, Intact
told Nasr that it would not pay the property damage claim.
Nasr commenced an action for indemnification under the policy
on April 22, 2015.
 Brown J.A. for the majority held that, in order for an
insurer’s conduct to give rise to a promissory estoppel preventing
the insurer from relying on a limitations defence, the insurer had
to have made a promise to the insured which the insured acted on
to its detriment: Nasr, at para. 54; and Maracle, at para. 57.
 During the litigation which ensued, Nasr admitted that
the insurer’s conduct following notice of the claim, in which the
insurer engaged in settlement discussions with the insured and
paid part of its claim, did not amount to the type of conduct
contemplated in Maracle.
 Brown J.A. for the majority [in Nasr], at para. 44, noted
therefore that, “there was no issue of a promissory estoppel precluding Intact from relying on the Act”. Therefore, Nasr ought to