or hyperbolic language is used in the context of political debate,
commentary, media campaigns and public discourse”: at paras.
 Regarding the last constituent element of the defence of
fair comment, the motion judge found that any person could honestly express the opinion, on the proved facts. She found that
while it might not be reasonable to hold this view, a person could
honestly believe that support for Mr. Alayan and his family constituted support for terrorists. She stated that “[a] person who
knows that Bahaa Alayan was allegedly involved in a terrorist
attack could believe that Mr. Lascaris supported terrorists as
a result of his meeting with Mr. Muhammad Alayan and his posts
online about the Alayan family”: at para. 60.
 Finally, the motion judge found that the respondent was
not motivated by malice as there was no evidence that the
respondent was acting other than in the pursuit of its genuinely
held beliefs: at paras. 63-64. The motion judge found that the
expressions fell within the purpose of the fair comment defence
which “is the protection of freedom of expression in order to
influence public opinion on genuine public issues”: at paras. 62, 65.
 In the end result, the motion judge concluded that the
appellant had not met his burden of demonstrating, under
s. 137.1(4)(a)( ii), that no valid defence exists.
 Before I begin my analysis, I should note that the motion
judge heard and decided the s. 137.1 motion before this court
released a series of judgments interpreting s. 137.1 in some detail:
see 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Assn. (2018), 142
O.R. (3d) 161,  O.J. No. 4449, 2018 ONCA 685 and the
related cases that were released simultaneously. To a large
degree, the motion judge’s analysis has been overtaken by Pointes
and those related authorities.
 I begin with two observations regarding the purpose
behind s. 137.1. As this court observed in Pointes, at para. 73,
s. 137.1 operates as a screening device. It is not to be used as
a surrogate for summary judgment: Pointes, at para. 78. The
motion is intended to be brought at the outset of the proceeding
before either the plaintiff or the defendant has had the opportunity to marshal the type of evidence that they would for a trial.
Indeed, motions under s. 137.1 will often be heard before there
has been any form of pre-trial discovery.
 The other observation is that this action has none of the
recognized indicia of a SLAPP lawsuit. As pointed out in Platnick