While the motion judge did not deal with the other defences
raised because of her conclusion on the defence of fair comment,
I must do so given the error that I have found in the motion
judge’s analysis. For the same reasons that I have just outlined in
dealing with the defence of fair comment, those realities could
serve to defeat any defence of justification.
 For qualified privilege to apply, the respondent must have
“an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make [the
impugned statements] to the person to whom [those statements
are] made”: Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995), 24
O.R. (3d) 865,  2 S.C.R. 1130,  S.C.J. No. 64, at para.
143. It is unclear what duty, of that type, the respondent could
point to in order to qualify its statements as falling within
a situation of qualified privilege, which in any event is rarely
available for widely circulated publications Indeed, I note that the
respondent did not pursue this defence on the appeal.
 In the end result, in my view, the appellant has met his
burden under s. 137.1(4)(a)( ii) to show that a reasonable trier
might conclude that none of the defences advanced would succeed.
 That leaves the balancing requirement under s. 137.1(4)(b).
Because of her conclusion regarding the defence of fair comment,
the motion judge did not consider the balancing requirement
under s. 137.1(4)(b). Consequently, this court must do so.
 Section 137.1(4)(b) reads:
[T]he harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as
a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public
interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public
interest in protecting that expression.
 In my view, this balance clearly favours the appellant. I say
that because, if the appellant’s action proceeds and if the appellant is ultimately successful, the damages to which the appellant
would be entitled could be significant. Accusing any person of
supporting terrorists is about as serious and damaging an allegation as can be made in these times.
 That reality is sufficient to establish the seriousness of the
harm to the appellant and to rebut the respondent’s submission
that the appellant failed to lead any evidence to show any damage
to his reputation arising from the impugned statements. On that
latter point, I would adopt the observation made by Bean J. in
Cooke v. MGN Ltd.,  EWHC 2831,  2 All E.R. 622
(Q.B.), at para. 43:
Some statements are so obviously likely to cause serious harm to a person’s
reputation that this likelihood can be inferred. If a national newspaper with
a large circulation wrongly accuses someone of being a terrorist or a paedo-
phile, then in either case (putting to one side for the moment the question of