a prompt and prominent apology) the likelihood of serious harm to reputation
is plain, even if the individual’s family and friends knew the allegation to be
See, also, Grant v. Torstar Corp.,  3 S.C.R. 640,  S.C.J.
No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, at para. 111.
 Further, the appellant is a lawyer. A lawyer’s reputation is
central to his/her ability to carry on their profession. As Cory J.
said in Hill, at para. 118:
The reputation of a lawyer is of paramount importance to clients, to other
members of the profession and to the judiciary. A lawyer’s practice is founded
and maintained upon the basis of a good reputation for professional integrity
and trustworthiness. It is the cornerstone of a lawyer’s professional life. Even
if endowed with outstanding talent and indefatigable diligence, a lawyer can-
not survive without a good reputation.
 The fact that the appellant is no longer engaged in private
practice does not mean that his reputation is still not of consequence. The appellant continues to represent clients on a pro
bono basis. His reputation will mean as much to those clients as it
would to any other client, especially given the nature of the
clients to whom he devotes his services.
 In reaching that conclusion, I do not mean to suggest that
the views of the respondent are not without merit or importance.
However, fair disagreements over policies and principles can be
undertaken, indeed ought to be undertaken, through responsible
discourse. Whatever disagreements there may be between the
appellant’s views and the respondent’s views, those views can be
exchanged and debated without the need for personal attacks. It
remains open to the respondent to express its views on issues
that concern it, such as the BDS resolution and broader BDS
debate, for example, without engaging in speech that is arguably
 The appeal is allowed, the order below is set aside and the
matter is remitted to the Superior Court of Justice. The appellant
is entitled to his costs of the appeal in the agreed amount of
$15,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.
 If the parties cannot agree on the costs of the motion
below, they may make written submissions. I would note, on that
point, that s. 137.1(8) provides a presumption that there will be
no costs of an unsuccessful motion under s. 137.1. The appellant
3 This passage was cited with approval in Lachaux v. Independent Print Ltd.,
 EWCA Civ. 1334,  Q.B. 594 (C.A.), at paras. 65-66.