admissibility ruling, at paras. 56-67. As such, Mr. Mullen’s September 2010 statement was held to be admissible.
 Second, the trial judge admitted Mr. McLellan’s November
2010 statement, in which Mr. McLellan said that the appellant
identified a target for the robbery, showed him and his accomplices
where Mr. Swan resided, and provided them with black hoodies
and “maybe” a toque: Tsega admissibility ruling, at para. 88. The
trial judge identified the dangers inherent in admitting the statement: the statement was not made under oath nor were the appropriate cautions provided, the statement was not videotaped,
no cross-examination occurred at the time of the statement and
there was no opportunity for defence counsel to cross-examine Mr.
McLellan and explore problems with his credibility and sincerity:
Tsega admissibility ruling, at para. 91. The trial judge concluded
that threshold reliability was established, albeit this finding was
a “close call”, based on the circumstantial guarantees of the reliability of the statement: Tsega admissibility ruling, at para. 111.
While noting that Mr. McLellan’s statement lacked the spontaneity
of Mr. Mullen’s statement, the trial judge pointed to a lack of
evidence of negative animus toward the appellant, the inculpatory
nature of portions of the statement and the presence of corroborating evidence in concluding that threshold reliability had been
established: Tsega admissibility ruling, at paras. 101-108. Although
there was an opportunity for collusion between Mr. McLellan
and Mr. Mullen between September 9 and November 16, the trial
judge was not convinced that there was actual collusion tainting
Mr. McLellan’s evidence: Tsega admissibility ruling, at para. 109.
 Third, the trial judge held that Mr. McLellan’s evidence
from his own trial was inadmissible. Such evidence included
Mr. McLellan’s description of the appellant’s alleged involvement
in the plan to rob Mr. Swan. Despite there being procedural
substitutes for contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant, the trial judge found there were limitations to the extent that
these safeguards could support a finding of threshold reliability in
the context of the appellant’s trial: Tsega admissibility ruling,
at paras. 114-116. Further, the format and manner of the cross-examination of Mr. McLellan reduced confidence in the accuracy
of his statements at trial, undermining the statements’ substantive reliability for the purpose of threshold reliability: Tsega
admissibility ruling, at paras. 120-121. Therefore, Mr. McLellan’s
trial evidence was not admitted.
 In Bradshaw, the issue for the court was: when and how
can a trial judge rely on corroborative evidence to conclude that