an alternative story because when he told the Buchanans about
being threatened and revealing Mr. Swan’s name and address,
Alec Buchanan told him that he could be charged as an accessory
 The admission to the Buchanans that he told the Toronto
Three Mr. Swan’s address is supportive of the veracity of the
statements only if the story about threatening is disbelieved.
 The cellphone records are evidence that the appellant was
closer to Mr. Swan’s residence than to his own home before the
home invasion. However, even those records are subject to debate,
as the expert evidence at trial made clear that cellphones signals
do not always bounce off of the nearest cellphone tower and tend
to identify only a general area where the cellphone might be
 In summary, looking at the corroborative evidence as
a whole, I cannot be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that it
rules out alternative explanations, such that the only remaining
likely explanation for the statements is Messrs. Mullen and
McLellan’s truthfulness. This is not a situation where cross-examination would be of no benefit. Cross-examination could well
cast doubt on the truthfulness of the statements. Accordingly,
I conclude that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay
(2) Curative proviso
 The Crown submits that if the trial judge erred in admit-
ting the hearsay statements, this court should dismiss the appeal
pursuant to the curative proviso in s. 686(b)( iii) of the Criminal
Code. This argument, which is not included in the Crown’s fac-
tum, may be dealt with summarily.
 In my view, the curative proviso has no application in the
case at bar. For it to be available, the Crown has the onus of
establishing, on the admissible evidence, that the case against the
appellant is overwhelming or that it can be safely said that the
legal error was harmless because it could have had no impact on
the verdict: R. v. Sarrazin,  3 S.C.R. 505,  S.C.J. No.
54, 2011 SCC 54, at paras. 25 and 28.
 The hearsay statements were important parts of the
Crown’s case against the appellant. They were the only evidence
directly tying him to the planning and execution of the home
invasion. They cannot be said to be inconsequential. Nor do I find
that the admissible evidence establishes an overwhelming case
against the appellant. I conclude, therefore, that there must be an
order for a new trial.