(3) Section 11(b) application
(a) Jordan analysis
 In Jordan, the Supreme Court recognized that timely jus-
tice is a hallmark of a free and democratic society. The court
mandated a new analytical framework for applying s. 11(b), moti-
vated by a desire to move from a culture of complacency that had
led to intolerable delays to a culture of accountability that would
result in a more efficient justice system. Under the Jordan
framework, all the players in the criminal justice system, includ-
ing the police, Crown, defence counsel and courts are required to
take responsibility for ensuring that accused are brought to trial
expeditiously. As the court stated, at para. 137, “[r]eal change will
require the efforts and coordination of all participants in the
criminal justice system”.
 The analytical framework for determining whether delay
in a given case has violated an accused’s s. 11(b) right to be tried
within a reasonable time has been well established in the Jordan
jurisprudence. It was succinctly summarized by the Supreme
Court in R. v. Cody,  1 S.C.R. 659,  S.C.J. No. 31,
2017 SCC 31, at paras. 20-25, as follows:
The new framework established in Jordan for analyzing whether an
accused person’s right to a trial within a reasonable time has been breached
centres on two presumptive ceilings: 18 months for cases tried in provincial
courts and 30 months for cases tried in superior courts (Jordan, at para. 46).
The first step under this framework entails “calculating the total delay
from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial” (Jordan, at para.
60). In this case, an information was sworn against Mr. Cody on January 12,
2010, and his trial was scheduled to conclude on January 30, 2015. This
makes the total delay approximately 60.5 months.
After the total delay is calculated, “delay attributable to the defence must
be subtracted” (Jordan, at para. 60). The result, or net delay, must then be
compared to the applicable presumptive ceiling. The analysis then “depends
upon whether the remaining delay — that is, the delay which was not caused
by the defence — is above or below the presumptive ceiling” (Jordan, at para.
67 (emphasis in original)).
If the net delay falls below the ceiling,
. . . then the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful
steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings,
and (2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
[Emphasis in original.] (Jordan, at para. 48)
If the net delay exceeds the ceiling,
. . . then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this
presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional