circumstances. If it cannot, the delay is unreasonable and a stay will
follow. (Jordan, at para. 47)
Where charges pre-date Jordan and the delay remains presumptively
unreasonable after deducting defence delay and accounting for and considering exceptional circumstances, the Crown may nevertheless demonstrate
that the transitional exceptional circumstance justifies the delay (Jordan,
at paras. 95-96).
(b) Ruling of the trial judge
 The appellant was charged on September 21, 2010 and was
convicted on June 30, 2016. The original charge was manslaugh-
ter, but it was later upgraded to first degree murder. In February
2012, the appellant was committed to stand trial on a charge
of second degree murder after the preliminary inquiry judge
rejected the Crown’s argument that he should be committed for
trial on a charge of first degree murder. His trial was scheduled to
begin on February 19, 2013.
 The Crown filed a certiorari application following the
committal on second degree murder. The hearing of that application was delayed pending the outcome of the Crown’s appeal of
a certiorari review to this court seeking to have the Toronto
Three indicted for first degree murder. The Crown appeal in that
case was successful and the case was remitted to the preliminarily
inquiry judge with a direction that Mr. McLellan be committed on
this charge and that the preliminary inquiry judge reconsider
whether there was sufficient evidence to commit Messrs. Mullen
and Barnett on first degree murder charges.
 In June 2013, the Crown’s certiorari application regarding
the appellant’s committal was heard and his case was remitted to
the preliminary inquiry judge to consider whether the appellant
could be liable for first degree murder through forcible confinement. In September 2013, the appellant was committed to stand
trial on a charge of first degree murder.
 The appellant then applied for certiorari of this committal.
The Crown brought a motion to remove counsel for the appellant
based on an alleged conflict of interest. That motion was ultimately resolved and the appellant’s certiorari application was
heard in November 2014 and dismissed in March 2015. The
appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court. In February 2016,
the Crown agreed to prefer a new indictment on a charge of
second degree murder and consented to re-election to trial by
judge alone. The appellant then abandoned his appeal as moot.
 The trial judge calculated the period between charge and
conviction as being 69.3 months: R. v. Tsega,  O.J. No.
2724, 2017 ONSC 3090 (S.C.J.), at para. 4 (the “Tsega Charter
application”). She focused her analysis on two periods of time.