The first period was from the first committal decision until the
decision to commit on first degree murder. The second period was
when the defence brought certiorari proceedings following the
appellant’s subsequent committal on first degree murder, and
then appealed the certiorari decision: Tsega Charter application,
at para. 25. The trial judge concluded that these periods of
“appellate delay” should not be included in the calculation of
delay. This reduced the period of delay to 22.4 months, which is
below the 30-month Jordan ceiling: Tsega Charter application,
at paras. 43-44. On that basis, she dismissed the s. 11(b) application: Tsega Charter application, at para. 46.
 Notwithstanding her ruling, the trial judge went on
to conduct a Jordan analysis. She deducted eight months for
defence delay: Tsega Charter application, at para. 58. The trial
judge then considered the issue of discrete, exceptional events
and deducted 26.25 months, consisting of one month due to
events impacting on the trial judge’s availability, 4.5 months at
the preliminary inquiry due to the refusal of witnesses to testify,
0.5 months at trial due to the refusal of witnesses to testify, and
20.25 months due to the defence certiorari application, and the
appeal therefrom: Tsega Charter application, at para. 73. Those
deductions left a balance of 35 months. The trial judge found that
the case was exceptionally complex from start to finish, both in
terms of the evidence collected and the legal issues involved,
and deducted another 18 months: Tsega Charter application, at
para. 85. Finally, the trial judge found that even if the total delay
was more than 30 months, she would have found, applying the
transitional provisions, that the delay was not unreasonable. The
Crown satisfied her that the time the case took was justified
based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed: Tsega Charter application, at para. 89.
(c) Post-Jordan jurisprudence and extraordinary remedies
 Jordan did not consider the impact of extraordinary remedies and interlocutory appeals from such orders on the determination of whether an accused’s s. 11(b) rights have been violated.
The post-Jordan jurisprudence also offers no clear answers.
Below, I will consider some of that case law before turning to
what I consider to be the correct approach.
( i) Crown applications for extraordinary remedies
 The most authoritative commentary on this issue in the
post-Jordan jurisprudence is this court’s decision in R. v.
Manasseri (2016), 132 O.R. (3d) 401,  O.J. No. 5004, 2016
ONCA 703, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A.