No. 513. In that case, George Kenny was discharged on assault
and manslaughter charges: at para. 272. The Crown moved to
quash the discharge, but its certiorari application was dismissed.
A Crown appeal of the certiorari decision was allowed and the
matter was remitted to a preliminary inquiry judge who committed Mr. Kenny on the manslaughter charge. Watt J.A. concluded
that “[w]hether the period encompassed by the motion for
certiorari and related appeals is deducted or remains included makes
no difference to the location of these proceedings” given that
Mr. Kenny’s s. 11(b) Charter rights had been infringed regardless:
Manasseri, at para. 336.
 The respondent relies on the obiter statement of Watt J.A.,
wherein he commented that it “would seem incongruous to treat
the time taken in pursuit of extraordinary remedies differently
than that taken in appeals from convictions, acquittals or stays of
proceedings as Potvin mandates”: Manasseri, at para. 339. This
interpretation of Manasseri would suggest that delay due to the
Crown certiorari applications should be deducted from the total
delay. The appellant, distinguishes the case at bar from Manasseri,
noting that in that case Mr. Kenny had originally been discharged
on all counts and that this discharge had been upheld on the
Crown’s original certiorari review. In contrast, in the case at bar,
the appellant was always a person charged with an offence.
 Another recent case dealing with the impact on s. 11(b) of
a Crown certiorari motion is Les Industries Garanties limitée v. R.,
 Q.J. No. 3998, 2017 QCCS 1504. In that case the motion
was eventually granted. The applicant argued that delay associated with the certiorari motion should not be deducted from the
total delay on the basis that judicial review of a committal decision constitutes unilateral state action that may control whether
or not charges are withdrawn or re-laid: Les Industries Garanties,
at para. 22, citing R. v. Milani (2014), 120 O.R. (3d) 641, 
O.J. No. 3247, 2014 ONCA 536, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
 S.C.C.A. No. 426. Further, the applicant suggested that the
Crown should have preferred an indictment instead of seeking
judicial review. Both of these arguments were rejected and the
court relied on R. v. Potvin,  2 S.C.R. 880,  S.C.J.
No. 63 and Manasseri to hold that delay associated with the
certiorari application does not form part of the total delay for s. 11(b)
purposes: Les Industries Garanties, at paras. 25-27.
 In a recent Ontario case the court examined the merits of
an application for extraordinary remedies to consider if it constituted an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. In R. v. Patrois, 
O.J. No. 701, 2018 ONSC 934, 404 C.R.R. (2d) 143 (S.C.J.), the
defence objected to the characterization of the Crown’s certiorari