Finally, in Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)
v. Dies,  O.J. No. 4894, 2018 ONCJ 641, the appellant had
previously brought a motion to quash the information, which was
later characterized as frivolous and meritless: at para. 30. Therefore, the court reasoned that the delay associated with the
certiorari motion should be deducted as defence delay, given that
the motion had no foundation in fact or law: Dies, at paras. 88-89.
Alternatively, even if the defence motion to quash was not viewed
as meritless, the time associated with the motion could be
deducted as a “discrete event” due to the inaccurate time estimates for trial provided by the parties: Dies, at para. 90.
(d) The correct approach to extraordinary remedies in the
 In cases where the accused does not remain charged with
a crime during the relevant period, it follows from the plain word-
ing of s. 11(b) that the constitutional right to be tried within
a reasonable time is not operative. That is not the situation in the
case at bar. The appellant remained subject to a criminal charge
throughout the entire period.
 As noted above, the trial judge excluded what she termed
“appellate delay” from the Jordan analysis. I consider that to
be the wrong analytical approach. By automatically excluding
delays occasioned by the pursuit of extraordinary remedies and
appeals therefrom, courts are not fulfilling their Jordan imposed
obligation of ensuring that all the parties in a case are acting
responsibly to ensure timely access to justice. For example, a situation could arise where the pursuit of extraordinary remedies
by the Crown could be considered frivolous or found to be undertaken in bad faith. The accused must have an ability to challenge
those actions and seek an effective remedy where they violate
his or her s. 11(b) rights.
 Similarly, it cannot be the case that the time taken for
extraordinary remedies and appeals therefrom must, without
exception, be included in the delay calculation under Jordan.
If that were the case, the Crown’s ability to bring an application
for extraordinary remedies would be effectively nullified. Given
the resource constraints in our criminal justice system, it would
be too risky for the Crown to seek such remedies because in so
doing, they would invariably run the risk of exceeding the Jordan
ceiling. In addition, defence counsel would obtain a tactical
advantage that would lead to applications for extraordinary remedies and appeals therefrom being undertaken as a matter of
course. Unless the Crown could prove that the defence engaged
in a deliberate and calculated tactic employed to delay the trial,