the defence could seek extraordinary remedies with impunity and
make it very difficult to meet the Jordan timelines. Such a result
is obviously contrary to what Jordan was designed to achieve.
 Thus, if the time spent seeking extraordinary remedies
should not be automatically excluded from or included in the
Jordan delay calculation, there must be some method of evaluating whether these periods should be included in a given case.
In Jordan, at para. 69, the court carved out an exception for
exceptional circumstances that lie outside the Crown’s control,
[at para. 69] “in the sense that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen
or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once
they arise” (emphasis in original). The court went on to state that
“the determination of whether circumstances are ‘exceptional’
will depend on the trial judge’s good sense and experience. The
list is not closed. However, in general, exceptional circumstances
fall under two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases”: Jordan, at para. 71.
 In my view, in a case where the Crown has brought a
certiorari application and/or appealed from a decision granting or
refusing certiorari resulting in net delay that exceeds the Jordan
ceiling, it should be open to the Crown to argue that such delay
constitutes a discrete event. In reaching that conclusion, I recognize that such cases do not fit neatly within the examples of discrete events provided by the court in Jordan and subsequent
jurisprudence. It could also be said that an application for
extraordinary remedies is not outside the control of the Crown as
it could always simply decline to bring the application.
 I believe that is too narrow an approach to discrete events.
A Crown has an obligation to take such steps as required to fulfill
his or her duties in the prosecution of a case, the same way
defence counsel must take all reasonable steps to make full
answer and defence on behalf of his or her client. Where the
Crown has a reasonable basis for seeking such remedies, it should
not be automatically forced to abandon its obligations for fear
of a s. 11(b) application. In that sense, an application for extraordinary remedies is not within the control of the Crown; rather,
it is something that arises on occasion in the circumstances of
a given case and must be undertaken in order for a Crown to fulfill his or her professional obligations.
 It must also be recognized that the Supreme Court did not
consider the impact of extraordinary remedies on the Jordan
framework and that in providing a carve out for exceptional circumstances the court explicitly chose to grant flexibility for
future courts in the application of the framework. Moreover, the