of fact requiring a trial regarding the conduct and motivations of
the supervisory committee members, and regarding what they
knew and said about funding. But, as a matter of law, he held the
action should have been brought as a complaint to the University
whose decision would have been subject to judicial review. According to the motion judge, academic and legal issues must be distinguished when reviewing a university’s conduct; academic issues
are to be resolved using a university’s informal operational and
formal appeal processes and thereafter by judicial review.
 Citing this court’s decisions in Gauthier c. Saint-Germain,
 O.J. No. 1771, 2010 ONCA 309, 264 O.A.C. 336, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A. No. 257, and Jaffer v.
York University,  O.J. No. 4252, 2010 ONCA 654, 268
O.A.C. 338, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused  S.C.C.A.
No. 402, the motion judge referred to the very broad discretion
a university has and that a student, by enrolling, subjects him or
herself to for the resolution of academic issues including evaluation of the student’s work, the structure of programs and the
competence of thesis supervisors, and that a court should be
reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of universities. He
acknowledged that in those cases this court held that the court
has jurisdiction to entertain a claim by a student against a university where the facts alleged constitute a cause of action based
on tort or breach of contract even if the dispute stems from an
academic or educational activity of the university. But, in his view,
if the [at para. 32] “pith and substance of the impugned conduct
is academic, it does not belong in the courts even if characterized
as a breach of contract or tort claim”. He held that if the
impugned conduct could be interpreted as academic, the court
should take a deferential approach to the university, and following such an approach find that the impugned conduct is not
outside the university’s broad discretion. He equated the
requirement articulated in Jaffer, that a plaintiff must establish
that the university’s actions go beyond its broad discretion, with
what he termed the “general rule” that courts ought not to
assume jurisdiction that others are better equipped to assume.
 To apply those concepts, the motion judge asked to what
degree a court or the University would be better able to deal with
the issues that concerned the appellant by reason of expertise,
policy and practicality. He reviewed the University’s internal
complaint processes, including the opportunity for the appellant
to have raised his concerns with the deans, provosts or their dep-uties at the University, or its ombudsman, and then to have
sought judicial review if he remained dissatisfied.