Applying this approach, the motion judge concluded that
the appellant’s complaints would have been more appropriately
resolved within the University, subject to judicial review. He held
that the subject matter of the claim involved academic advancement and administration of a university program within the
sphere of the University’s discretion, and in areas where the University has more expertise and could have given faster and more
direct remedies (even if they were not the remedies the appellant
now seeks). He therefore held that as a matter of law the appellant’s claim should be dismissed.
The Standard of Review
 Where, on a motion for summary judgment, the motion
judge applies an incorrect principle of law, or errs with respect to
a purely legal question, such as the elements that must be proved
to make out a cause of action, the decision will be reviewed on
a standard of correctness: Hyrniak v. Mauldin,  1 S.C.R. 87,
 S.C.J. No. 7, 2014 SCC 7, at para. 84.
 The motion judge proceeded on a purely legal basis, applying principles of law to dismiss a claim that he held would, absent
those principles, be a claim “that would require a trial to resolve”,
given [at para. 6] “the conflict in the factual record underlying
the claim”. In order to reach the result he did, the motion judge
was required to be correct about the legal principles. The applicable standard of review is therefore correctness.
 In my view, the result in this case is controlled by this
court’s decisions in Gauthier and Jaffer. In both of those cases,
which involved claims of breach of contract by students against
universities, this court held that if a plaintiff alleges the constitu-
ent elements of a cause of action based in tort or breach of con-
tract, while claiming damages, the court will have jurisdiction
even if the dispute stems from the scholastic or academic activi-
ties of the university in question. The question to be addressed
was therefore whether the factual issues the motion judge found
to exist could, if resolved in the appellant’s favour at trial, make
out a cause of action for breach of contract. Because they could,
the University’s motion ought to have been dismissed.
 The perceived advantages of the University’s internal
complaint processes were not germane to the issue.
A. Gauthier and Jaffer
 Although the motion judge referred to Gauthier and Jaffer,
properly understood they do not support and in fact contradict