Graduate Student Handbook (the “Handbook”). The motion judge
referred to the Handbook as something seemingly with contractual
force and made no finding that the contract excluded those terms.
However, he did not apply its terms in his analysis.
 The Handbook provided, as to supervision, that thesis
[S]hould have sufficient familiarity with the field of research to provide
appropriate guidance and supervision, or indicate a willingness to gain that
familiarity before agreeing to act as supervisor.
 As to funding, the Handbook provided:
The supervisor should make the student aware, very early on, of . . . various
sources of funding. . . . The nature of any financial support provided by the
supervisor should be communicated clearly to the student, in writing, including such details as the amount of financial support, the length of time of such
support, and any specific conditions pertaining to this financial support.
 The contract between the appellant and the University
would also be subject to general provisions of the law, including
the “general duty of honesty in contractual performance”: see
Bhasin v. Hrynew,  3 S.C.R. 494,  S.C.J. No. 71, 2014
SCC 71, at para. 73. As Cromwell J. put it, this “common law duty
. . . applies to all contracts to act honestly in the performance of
contractual obligations” and “means simply that parties must not
lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters
directly linked to the performance of the contract”: Bhasin, at
paras. 33, 73. The motion judge did not consider this duty.
 The broad discretion of the University that the motion
judge referred to must be understood in light of these provisions
and the general duty of honest performance. As Rouleau J.A. noted in Gauthier, the broad discretion would be an answer to
a claim that did not allege more than that an academic result is
wrong or a professor is incompetent: at para. 47. Here, more
is alleged and there are genuine issues requiring a trial as to
whether more occurred.
 The appellant’s allegations could result in a finding that
the appellant was knowingly misled as to the details, amount and
duration of his financial support, in breach of the Handbook’s
requirement to communicate those matters to the appellant and
in violation of the duty of honest performance. If that were the
resolution of the genuine issue requiring a trial regarding funding, the appellant’s claim could not be rebutted by reference
to the University’s broad discretion. The University did not argue
that it had a discretion to depart from contractual terms or from
the duty of honest performance — nor could it have so argued.