Similarly, the appellant’s allegation regarding the supervisory committee is not that its members were incompetent. It is
that, contrary to the Handbook, they agreed to be supervisors
without sufficient familiarity with the appellant’s field of research
or a willingness to gain it, and used their positions as supervisors
to pressure the appellant out of the Ph.D. program. If that were
the finding arising from a trial, the appellant’s claim could not be
rebutted by reference to the University’s broad discretion.
 To be sure, there are other possible outcomes of the genuine issues of fact requiring a trial, including factual findings of
conduct that would be protected by the University’s broad discretion such that no breach of contract occurred. But unless all outcomes would result in the failure of the appellant’s claims, his
action cannot be dismissed as a matter of law. As shown above,
not all outcomes are amenable to that result.
 The resolution of the genuine issues of fact the motion
judge found to exist could thus result in findings of breach of contract. The appellant has claimed damages for such a breach. That
is a legal claim for a remedy over which the court has jurisdiction.
The existence of damages and the necessary causal link between
any breach and those damages were not in issue on the motion or
this appeal. The claim cannot be properly characterized as one
that never should have been in court to begin with, at least from
a legal point of view. Nor is it a claim that the court may decline
jurisdiction to address on the basis that others may be better
equipped to resolve it.
C. The University’s internal complaint processes
 The parties disagreed before us as to whether there was
any internal complaint process to which the appellant could have
had resort and whether that matter was even properly before the
motion judge. It is not necessary to resolve those issues. Given my
analysis above, whether an internal process at the University
existed with advantages from an expertise, policy and practicality
standpoint to resolve the appellant’s complaints — albeit with
remedies other than what the appellant is seeking — is not
germane. It was not suggested that the parties had agreed
that claims for damages for breach of contract would be heard in
a forum other than the court.
 For the reasons above, I would allow the appeal, set aside
the decision of the motion judge and substitute an order dismiss-
ing the University’s motion for summary judgment and directing
that the matter proceed to trial.