time as they knew about their claims against Dr. Barzo). The
appellants say that the evidence does not support a finding that
they ought reasonably to have known that the three respondents
caused or contributed to Mr. Morrison’s injuries more than two
years before they sought to add them as defendants to the action.
Second, the appellants assert that the motion judge erred in dismissing their motion based on her conclusion that they did not
demonstrate due diligence.
 Although there are differences between the positions of the
respondents on appeal, essentially they all assert that the motion
judge’s dismissal of the motion was properly based on her finding,
which was supported by the evidence, that the appellants ought
reasonably to have discovered their claims against the respondents at the same time as they discovered their claims against the
chiropractor. The respondents Ms. Boulanger and Ms. Edwards
continue to assert that the motion judge properly took into consideration the appellants’ failure to adduce evidence of the steps
they took to investigate the respondents’ potential negligence,
and they contend that lack of due diligence is a proper factor in
motions of this sort, to rebut the “presumption of prejudice”.
Alternatively, if the motion judge erred in the test she applied, the
respondents ask that this court, applying the correct test, uphold
the decision dismissing the motion. They rely on the information
contained in the clinical records, as well as the proposed amended
pleading, and assert that the allegations against the respondents
contain no new material facts, and that substantially all of what
is alleged ought to have been known to the appellants around the
time Mr. Morrison was diagnosed with CES.
 As I will explain, the motion judge erred when she
diverged from the clear scheme of the Limitations Act to decide
whether the limitation period had expired.
 First, the motion judge proceeded on the basis that there
was a “presumption of prejudice”, when a party is added to litigation after the expiry of a limitation period, that the appellants
had to overcome by establishing due diligence. This is inconsistent with the framework under the Limitations Act, where
“due diligence” is now part of the determination of a claim’s discoverability under s. 5(1)(b), and s. 21 prohibits the addition of
a party to an action where a limitation period has expired,
whether or not there is prejudice to the defendant.
 Second, the motion judge did not make findings of fact as
to when the appellants actually discovered the claim or when
they ought reasonably to have done so (other than to say that it