enacting the regulation. Even if the New Regulation was enacted
in response to the Ontario Court decision acquitting the Applicant, there is nothing improper about Cabinet responding to judicial decisions interpreting existing law. More importantly, as
already noted, Katz, at para. 27, has reiterated that the motive
behind the New Regulation is an irrelevant consideration.
 The Applicant’s suggestion that the New Regulation is
“irrelevant”, “extraneous” or “completely unrelated” to the purpose of the Act because the Act and the regulatory scheme are
directed at wine, not wine manufacturers, ignores one of the fundamental components of the scheme, which is set out at s. 6(2) of
the Act. Section 6(2) provides that only a member may apply for
a wine approval. In the absence of the New Regulation, a winery
would be required to be a member in order to apply to use the
regulated terms, but would not have to remain a member to actually use the terms.
 Membership plays an important part in allowing the
VQAO to fulfill its function. Members pay fees that fund the
VQAO’s operations. If a member refuses to cooperate with the
VQAO when it seeks to inspect or audit, the VQAO has a powerful administrative sanction available: revoke their membership.
This sanction becomes less compelling if non-members may continue to sell preapproved wines using VQAO designations.
 The VQAO retains the ability to obtain a search warrant
to enforce its inspection powers against non-members and the
ability to prosecute a non-member if it fails to co-operate with
an inspection, but these remedies are considerably more costly
and time-consuming than the administrative sanction of membership revocation.
 Non-members who are allowed to use VQAO reserved
terms are benefiting from the reputation of a scheme that they do
not subsidize. This is unfair to other members. It could also
mislead consumers into believing that there is an association
between the VQAO and the wine manufacturer who is, in fact, no
longer a member of the VQAO.
 In the face of these considerations, which are all reasonable, the Applicant cannot discharge the burden that it has to
show that the New Regulation is “irrelevant”, “extraneous” or
“completely unrelated” to the purpose of the Act.
 The Applicant complains that it still has VQAO approved
wine that it has not sold. The Applicant is still entitled to sell this
wine; it just cannot continue to do so using any of the VQAO
regulated terms. Furthermore, under the By-Law that resulted
in the Applicant’s termination, the Applicant had a total of
30 months to sell its approved VQAO inventory after it stopped