contributions regarding the Act did not exemplify a genuine interest in the outcome
of the application, and the applicant had not established that the application was
a reasonable and effective way of bringing the issues before the courts.
Cases referred to
Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against
Violence Society,  2 S.C.R. 524,  S.C.J. No. 45, 2012 SCC 45,
325 B.C.A.C. 1, 434 N.R. 257, 34 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 2012EXP-3353, J.E. 2012-1793,
EYB 2012-211411,  10 W.W.R. 423, 95 C.R. (6th) 1, 267 C.R.R. (2d) 1,
290 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 352 D.L.R. (4th) 587, 220 A.C. W.S. (3d) 536, 103 W.C.B. (2d) 625
Statutes referred to
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 15
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 96
Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, ss. 267.5(1) [as am.], 280
APPEAL from the order of Belobaba J.,  O.J. No. 2777, 2017
ONSC 2884 (S.C.J.) dismissing an application for a declaration.
Rocco Galati and Peter Murray, for appellant.
Daniel Guttman and Padraic Ryan, for Attorney General of
Jeff Galway, for Insurance Bureau of Canada.
 BY THE COURT: — The appellant appeals from the dismissal
of his application for a declaration that two provisions of
the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, relating to automobile accident claims — ss. 267.5(1) and 280 — violate ss. 7 and 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that s. 280
contravenes s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 267.5(1)
places limits on the recovery of pre-trial income loss and s. 280
confers jurisdiction over statutory accident benefits disputes to
an administrative tribunal.
 The application judge found that the appellant, a lawyer,
lacked private and public interest standing to bring the application. The fact that his practice involved representing clients who
were affected by these provisions did not give him standing to
mount a challenge to the sections. The appellant maintains that
the application judge erred in denying both private and public
 We disagree.
 In our view, the application judge correctly determined that
private interest standing is not made out. The appellant failed to
demonstrate that the impugned provisions affect him personally
and directly. The appellant’s experience litigating insurance
claims and his concern for properly advising his clients and for
adequately settling their claims falls short of establishing that the
provisions had a direct impact on him. As the application judge