noted, the appellant has not been injured in an automobile accident, is not claiming for lost income and is not disputing a statutory benefit entitlement before the administrative tribunal.
 Turning to the issue of public interest standing, the appellant argues, in effect, that the application judge considered each
of the three factors in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown
Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 
2 S.C.R. 524,  S.C.J. No. 45, 2012 SCC 45, separately,
requiring that each of the three be satisfied. In his submission,
the application judge ignored the flexibility in the application of
the test that the Supreme Court of Canada prescribes. We would
not give effect to this submission.
 Although the application judge’s reasons could be read as
suggesting that his analysis of each of the three factors was
carried out separately and that he may have viewed them as prerequisites, in our view, this suggestion is not made out. The application judge correctly listed the three factors, namely whether the
case raises a serious justiciable issue; whether the applicant has
a real stake or a genuine interest in its outcome; and whether, in
all the circumstances, the proposed application is a reasonable
and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.
 Reading the reasons as a whole, it is apparent that the
application judge considered the three factors in combination and
with the flexibility required. We reject, therefore, the suggestion
that he acted on the wrong principles or erred in law.
 Further, we do not consider that the appellant’s scholarly
contributions regarding the Insurance Act exemplify a genuine
interest in the outcome of the application. Moreover, the appellant, who has not filed an affidavit in his own name, has failed to
establish that the application is a reasonable and effective way of
bringing the case to court. Although his two affidavit witnesses
may be unable to bring an action themselves, the appellant has
not provided a compelling reason why an auto accident victim
who is directly impacted by the impugned provisions could not
challenge the legislation.
 The application judge’s discretionary decision is, in our
view, entitled to deference and we see no reason to interfere.
 The appeal is therefore dismissed. Costs are awarded to
the Attorney General in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of
HST and disbursements. No costs are awarded to the Insurance
Bureau of Canada.