In Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers),
 2 S.C.R. 557,  S.C.J. No. 58, 114 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at
para. 59 (“Pezim”), Iacobucci J. spoke for the court and held that
the “primary goal” of securities regulation “is the protection of
investor but other goals include capital market efficiency and
ensuring public confidence in the system”.
 Similarly, in Theratechnologies Inc. v. 121851 Canada Inc.,
 2 S.C.R. 106,  S.C.J. No. 18, 2015 SCC 18
(“Theratechnologies”), Abella J. spoke for the court and held, at
para. 25, that the statutory requirements for continuous disclosure through periodic and timely disclosure are designed to create
a “level playing field” where all investors have access to the same
information and all pricing and investment decisions are made
from the same starting point.
 Part XXIII.1 of the Act provides a mechanism by which
aggrieved shareholders may obtain access to justice when issuers
breach their continuous disclosure obligations. Secondary market
liability legislation “emerged directly out of Canada-wide efforts
to develop a more meaningful and accessible form of recourse for
investors” (Theratechnologies, at para. 27).
 Part XXIII.1 of the Act is remedial legislation that should
be interpreted broadly and purposively (Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce v. Green,  3 S.C.R. 801,  S.C.J. No. 60,
2015 SCC 60, at paras. 75, 178, 186 (“CIBC SCC”)).17
 Côté J. held in CIBC SCC that the leave requirement is
part of the “specific balance struck” under the legislation providing
for the statutory claim, which includes a limitation period and no
requirement to prove reliance on the misrepresentation (at para. 75).
 Consequently, it is settled law that a broad and purposive
interpretation of the Act is required when interpreting s. 138.3 to
ensure the goal of investor protection, keeping in mind the
balance set out by the leave requirement as discussed in more
Issue 3: The test for materiality
 The relevant principles to establish materiality were set
out by Rothstein J. in Sharbern Holding Inc. v. Vancouver Airport
Centre Ltd.,  2 S.C.R. 175,  S.C.J. No. 23, 2011 SCC
23, at para. 61 (“Sharbern”):
17 Both the majority reasons of Côté J. (at para. 75) and the dissenting reasons of Karakatsanis J. (at paras. 178 and 186) affirm the same principle.
See, also, Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc.,  3 S.C.R. 331,  S.C.J. No.
44, 2007 SCC 44, at para. 32.