Stockwoods was not required to commence a new proceeding by
way of application.
 On June 23, 2017, the motion judge held that the relevant
provisions in the contingency fee agreement were valid and binding on the appellants. Under those provisions, and in particular
para. 16, the appellants were required to join Stockwoods in its
application for court approval to include in the fee payable to
Stockwoods part of the amount paid to the appellants as costs.
The motion judge held that the appellants were required by the
agreement to support Stockwoods’s application, and that they
could not lead evidence or make submissions opposing Stockwoods’s request for court approval of the payment: Almalki v.
Canada (Attorney General),  O.J. No. 4456, 2017 ONSC
 On September 14, 2017, the motion judge held that Stockwoods had established that “exceptional circumstances” existed.
Accordingly, Stockwoods was entitled to a portion of the amount
paid to the appellants as legal fees as part of the contingency fee
agreement. She approved the payment of the portion of the costs
as set out in para. 16 of the contingency fee agreement. She also
awarded Stockwoods its costs on the motions in the amount of
The Terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement
 Paragraph 4 of the contingency fee agreement provided
that Stockwoods would receive a percentage of any settlement or
judgment obtained by the appellants. The percentage depended
on the timing and amount of the judgment or settlement. Paragraph 5 gave examples of the relevant calculations.
 In para. 19 of the agreement, the appellants undertook to
consent to court approval of the contingency fee agreement.
Paragraph 8, however, expressly preserved the appellants’ right
to apply to a court for a determination of whether the fees ultimately charged under the agreement were “fair and reasonable”.
The clients had six months from the receipt of Stockwoods’s bill
to apply for that assessment.
 In para. 11, the appellants acknowledged that they had
been informed by Stockwoods that they should obtain independent legal advice before signing the contingency agreement. The
appellants further acknowledged that they had an opportunity to
seek independent legal advice before signing the agreement.
 Paragraph 16, and, to a lesser extent, para. 15 of the
contingency fee agreement are at the centre of this litigation.