— Were the appellants wrongly denied the opportunity to make
submissions on the existence of “exceptional circumstances”?
— Did the court err in finding exceptional circumstances?
 In their factum, the appellants also seek leave to appeal
the costs order made by the motion judge.
A. Could Stockwoods proceed by way of motion?
 The appellants submit that s. 28.1(8) of the Act precluded
Stockwoods from proceeding by way of motion within the existing
action. Section 28.1(8) requires the solicitor and client to “jointly
apply” for an order approving a contingency fee agreement that
includes payment of costs paid to the client. According to the
appellants, s. 28.1(8) required that Stockwoods initiate a new
proceeding by way of application, rather than bring a motion in
the existing action.
 I do not accept this submission. I do not read the word
“apply” in s. 28.1(8) as referencing the need to bring a formal
application as described in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O.
1990, Reg. 194. I read the word in a more generic way, as simply
indicating that the parties must jointly put the matter before the
court seeking the approval contemplated under the section: see
56 King Inc. v. Aviva Canada Inc.,  O.J. No. 2627, 2017
ONCA 408, at para. 4.
 In this case, the motion under s. 28.1(8) was brought with
a motion for approval of the settlement as it related to the infant
plaintiffs. The request to approve the settlement was properly
brought by way of motion under rule 7.08. A motion for approval
of a contingency fee agreement applicable to infant plaintiffs may
also be brought as part of a motion for approval of the settlement:
Contingency Fee Agreements, O. Reg. 195/04, s. 5(1)(b).
 The enforceability of the contingency fee agreement as
against all of the appellants is, in my view, properly viewed as
part of the motion for the approval of the settlement and the contingency fee agreement as it relates to the infant plaintiffs. The
outcome of the arguments raised by Mr. Almalki challenging the
contingency fee agreement would, if successful, impact on the
infant plaintiffs as well as Mr. Almalki.
 I do not suggest that the matter could not have been
properly brought forward by way of an application: see Solicitors
Act, ss. 23, 28.1(11). In my view, however, an application was not
the only mode of putting the matter before the court. The issues
arising out of para. 16 of the contingency fee agreement were
sufficiently connected to the motion brought for approval of the