settlement and contingency fee agreement as applied to the
infant plaintiffs to be, in reality, part of the same motion.
 I also agree with the motion judge that the appellants have
shown no prejudice flowing from proceeding by way of motion
rather than by application. The prejudice claim advanced by the
appellants in this court rests, not in the nature of the procedural
vehicle used to bring the matter forward, but rather in the
motion judge’s conclusion that the appellants, by virtue of agreeing
to para. 16 of the contingency fee agreement, were required to
support Stockwoods’s motion under s. 28.1(8). There is no reason
to think that the motion judge’s analysis or conclusion would
have been different had she addressed the issue wearing her
application judge’s hat rather than her motion judge’s hat.
B. What does paragraph 16 mean and is it enforceable?
 The motion judge interpreted para. 16 of the contingency
fee agreement as requiring the appellants to support Stockwoods’s application for a payment of a portion of the legal fees
paid to the appellants as part of the settlement. The motion judge
held that the appellants could not oppose the application or offer
evidence to challenge the existence of the requisite “exceptional
 The appellants attack this holding on two fronts. First,
they submit that, on a proper interpretation, para. 16 does not
preclude the appellants from opposing the motion under
s. 28.1(8). Second, they argue that if the motion judge properly
interpreted para. 16, it contravenes s. 28.1(8) of the Act and cannot be enforced.
 The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants focus
on the meaning and enforceability of para. 16 of the contingency
fee agreement, and its interplay with s. 28.1(8) of the Act. Despite
some of the assertions made in Mr. Almalki’s affidavits about
Stockwoods’s dockets and their conduct of his case, there is no
claim, apart from the challenge to para. 16 of the agreement, to
the terms of the contingency fee agreement or the fee claimed
under para. 4 of the agreement. The appellants have not sought
to assess the fees under the “fair and reasonable” standard in
ss. 23 and 24 of the Act.
( i) The interpretation of paragraph 16
 As often happens, the parties disagree over the standard of
review applicable to the submission that the motion judge erred
in her interpretation of para. 16 of the contingency fee agreement. I will assume, in keeping with the appellants’ submission,
that correctness is the appropriate standard. For the reasons that