follow, I view the motion judge’s interpretation as the only
reasonable interpretation of para. 16 available, and therefore the
 This contingency fee agreement was the product of lengthy
negotiation between Mr. Almalki and Stockwoods. Several drafts
of the agreement were exchanged and modified. Stockwoods recommended to Mr. Almalki that he obtain independent legal
advice and he did so. According to Mr. Almalki, he did not seek
advice about the meaning of para. 16.
 The Government of Canada made various offers to settle.
Stockwoods explained the fee ramifications of these offers to Mr.
Almalki, including the payment of a portion of the amount
attributable to his costs to Stockwoods according to para. 16. Mr.
Almalki had no questions about para. 16.
 According to Mr. Almalki’s affidavit, he first raised para. 16
with Stockwoods shortly before the motion to approve the settlement because a plaintiff in one of the other two related actions
questioned whether Stockwoods’s contingency fee could include
a proportion of the costs paid as part of the settlement. Mr.
Almalki followed up on the question raised by the other plaintiff
and eventually decided to object to para. 16. The question posed
by the other plaintiff would, of course, have made no sense to Mr.
Almalki unless he understood that the agreement he had signed
contemplated that Stockwoods would be paid a proportion of any
legal costs paid to him by the Government of Canada.3
 In her June 23, 2017 ruling, the motion judge acknowl-
edged that contingency fee agreements were subject to closer
scrutiny than purely commercial contracts. She went on, after
a review of the relevant evidence, to hold, at para. 21:
In this case however, there is no evidence of fraud, duress, mistake of fact or
unconscionability. There is no evidence of Mr. Almalki’s failure to understand
the fee agreement or specifically the effect of the language of paragraph 16.
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs were misled by Stockwoods.
 The record fully supports these findings and I would defer
 The language of paras. 15 and 16 is free of any ambiguity
or uncertainty. Paragraph 15 acknowledges that the appellants
are initially entitled to receive any amount awarded or paid to
them as costs. Paragraph 16 qualifies para. 15 by providing that
Stockwoods and the appellants mutually intend that, should
exceptional circumstances arise, Stockwoods’s fee should be
3 The plaintiffs in the other two related actions have not challenged the
contingency fee agreements.