Finally, the motion judge placed great weight on a May 31,
2015 e-mail sent by Mr. Laurie to Mr. Brown, about six months
before Mr. Laurie’s death, in which he urged Mr. Brown to
consider directing $100,000 of the insurance proceeds to his family
following his death. At para. 42 of his reasons, the motion judge
wrote that the clear and obvious inference from this e-mail was
that “Mr. Laurie did not have a subjective belief that there was
a buy-sell agreement requiring payment of the insurance proceeds for the shares”. We see no palpable and overriding error in
that inference; it was clearly open for the motion judge to make
given the clear language of the e-mail.
 After considering the entirety of the evidence, the motion
judge concluded, at paras. 48 and 49:
The evidentiary burden is on the Estate to show a genuine issue requiring
a trial on the issue of whether there was a contract governing the payment
of life insurance proceeds. When considering the note of Mr. Smolders in
the context of the totality of the evidence, this court finds that there is no
genuine issue requiring a trial in relation to entitlement to the proceeds.
Neither have the defendants raised a genuine issue respecting the existence
of a buy-sell agreement. The evidentiary record does not demonstrate that
the proceeds of insurance were to fund the purchase of the shares or that
either party was otherwise contractually obligated to do so. On this evi-
dence the Estate has not led evidence to show a genuine issue.
I find there was term life insurance on the other personally and nothing
more. There was also no agreement or contract between the plaintiff and Mr.
Laurie that the proceeds of life insurance were to go to the Laurie Estate.
 Those conclusions were fully supported by the evidence.
 The appellants submit that the motion judge required
viva voce evidence from Ms. Laurie and Mr. Smolders before
determining that no buy-sell agreement existed. We disagree.
Ms. Laurie’s affidavit disclosed that her only evidence on the
issue was the hearsay statement from her husband. As to the
evidence of Mr. Smolders, the onus lay on the appellants to
demonstrate the existence of some circumstance that justified
departing from the clear beneficiary designation in the policy.
They were required to put their “best foot forward” on that
issue. Yet, they did not file an affidavit from Mr. Smolders or
examine him under rule 39.03 [of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194]. The motion judge did not err by granting summary judgment in the absence of such evidence.
 Finally, the appellants argue that the motion judge erred
in ruling that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial in
relation to its argument that Mr. Brown’s failure to keep the
company’s minute book up-to-date meant that he never had
a legal interest in the shares of the company, with the result
that the parties’ share purchase agreement was void. We see no