and expenses of the arbitrators and the ICC administrative
expenses for the claims which have been referred to it by the
parties”. The payment must be in cash, unless a party’s share of
the fees and expenses is greater than US$500,000, in which case
the party may post a bank guarantee. The initial US$5,000 filing
fee is credited against the claimant’s portion of this advance but
is non-refundable. The administrative fee component of this
advance is at least US$2,500 per party for disputes valued at
under US$200,000. These fees do not cover counsel fees, travel or
other expenses related to participating in the arbitration.
 Accordingly, the up-front administrative/filing-related
costs for a driver to participate in the mediation-arbitration process in the Netherlands prescribed in the Arbitration Clause is
US$14,500. As an UberEATS driver, the appellant earns about
$20,800-$31,200 per year, before taxes and expenses.
II: THE DECISION BELOW
 The motion judge granted Uber’s motion to stay the action
in favour of arbitration. In so doing, the motion judge determined
that the dispute is both international and commercial, such that
the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, S.O. 2017,
c. 2, Sch. 5 (the “ICAA”) and not the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O.
1991, c. 17 (the “Arbitration Act, 1991”) applied. However, the
motion judge noted, at para. 35, that “ultimately not much turns
on this point”, because the appellant was unable to demonstrate
that the exceptions under either Act warranted a denial of Uber’s
 Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Seidel
v. TELUS Communications Inc.,  1 S.C.R. 531,  S.C.J.
No. 15, 2011 SCC 15 and this court’s decision in Wellman
v. TELUS Communications Co. (2017), 138 O.R. (3d) 413, 
O.J. No. 2800, 2017 ONCA 433, the motion judge held that courts
must enforce arbitration agreements freely entered into, even in
contracts of adhesion. Any restriction on the parties’ freedom to
arbitrate must be found in the legislation.
 The motion judge then concluded that the plain language
of the ESA does not restrict the parties from arbitrating. He also
concluded that the arbitrability of employment agreements was
not a question of pure statutory interpretation but instead raised
a “complex issue of mixed fact and law”, one for the arbitrator to
decide at first instance under the competence-competence principle. Finally, the motion judge rejected the unconscionability
exception that the appellant advanced under both the Arbitration
Act, 1991 and the ICAA.