There are two problems with this submission. First, it extracts
s. 96 from the relevant statutory context and treats it as a stand-
alone provision, contrary to the modern approach to statutory
interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo.
Second, it invites an unduly narrow interpretation of s. 96 which
would, if accepted, authorize employers to contract their employ-
ees out of s. 96, and thus out of the entire investigative process,
without offending s. 5(1). That outcome would undermine the
protective purpose of the ESA. It would also run afoul of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s directive regarding the interpretative
approach to be taken to the ESA. As Iacobucci J. said in Macht-
inger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.,  1 S.C.R. 986,  S.C.J.
No. 41, at p. 1003 S.C.R.:
The objective of the Act is to protect the interests of employees by requiring
employers to comply with certain minimum standards . . .
Accordingly, an interpretation of the Act which encourages employers to
comply with the minimum requirements of the Act, and so extends its protections to as many employees as possible, is to be favoured over one that does not.
 I return then to the point that it is for the court to decide
whether the exceptions in s. 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991
apply when an order for a stay of a proceeding is sought. Uber
argues that this is an issue for the arbitrator to determine
because it is an issue going to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
Uber invokes the “competence-competence” principle in support
of its position.
 I do not agree with Uber’s position because, in my view,
this issue is not about jurisdiction. I am aware of the general
approach that any dispute over an arbitrator’s jurisdiction should
first be determined by the arbitrator but that addresses situations where the scope of the arbitration is at issue. That is not
this case. There does not appear to be any dispute that, if the
Arbitration Clause is valid, the appellant’s claim would fall within
it. Rather, the issue here is the validity of the Arbitration Clause.
The answer to that question is one for the court to determine as
s. 7(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 makes clear.
 In light of that conclusion, the competence-competence
principle has no application to this case and, consequently, I do
not need to address the arguments made with respect to it.
 Given my conclusion regarding the meaning of “
employment standard”, it follows that the Arbitration Clause constitutes
a contracting out of the ESA. It eliminates the right of the appellant (or any other driver) to make a complaint to the Ministry of
Labour regarding the actions of Uber and their possible violation of
the requirements of the ESA. In doing so, it deprives the appellant