counsel are somewhat beside the point. The trial judge was also
aware that immigration consequences were in play because, in his
submissions on sentence, defence counsel told the judge that the
appellant was to report to immigration on release from custody.
An experienced trial judge would have no difficulty in fathoming
the reason for the attendance or the likely consequence.
 The full burden of establishing prejudice then rests on the
impact of the failure of trial counsel to discuss with the Crown or
submit to the judge an apportionment of the credit for pre-disposition custody in such a way that the custodial portion of the
proposed 12-month sentence would not exceed six months.
 This failure had no effect on the reliability of the result
of the proceedings. The appellant pleaded guilty. His plea of
guilty was voluntary, unequivocal and informed. The legal effect
of that plea and the congruity of the admitted facts with the
essential elements of the relevant offences resulted in inevitable
 It is also far from clear that this apportionment device is
so readily available to sentencing judges. To the extent its application would run afoul of the principle accepted in Pham, that the
risk of deportation cannot justify imposing a sentence inconsistent with the fundamental principles of proportionality, it
 Nothing that occurred here compromised the fairness of
the proceedings either in connection with the entry of the conviction or the determination of a fit sentence.
 The appellant also invited us to rework the sentencing
calculus to achieve a result his counsel should have obtained had
he done so at trial. I see no reason to do so. For a spousal abuse
recidivist and serial probation order violator, the sentence
imposed could be seen as rather lenient.
 I would dismiss the conviction and sentence appeals in
their entirety, other than to remit any victim fine surcharge
that has been paid in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
R. v. Boudreault,  S.C.J. No. 58, 2018 SCC 58, 50 C.R.