public interest: Levant, at paras. 24-25. She recognized that the
Fort McMurray fires were matters of public interest, but found
that the Day tweets were, “in pith and substance, direct personal
attacks on Ezra Levant”: Levant, at para. 24. Citing Able Translations Ltd. v. Express International Translations Inc.,  O.J.
No. 5740, 2016 ONSC 6785, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 380 (S.C.J.), affd
 O.J. No. 4443, 2018 ONCA 690, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 568, the
motion judge noted that “[w]here the pith and substance of the
matter is a defamatory personal attack thinly veiled as a discussion on matters of public interest, the court has all the tools it
requires to determine the true nature of the expression and rule
accordingly”: Levant, at para. 23.
 The motion judge did not have the benefit of this court’s
decision in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Assn. (2018),
142 O.R. (3d) 161,  O.J. No. 4449, 2018 ONCA 685, in which
the concept of “public interest” was summarized at para. 65:
In summary, the concept of “public interest” as it is used in s. 137.1(3) is
a broad one that does not take into account the merits or manner of the expres-
sion, nor the motive of the author. The determination of whether an expres-
sion relates to a matter of public interest must be made objectively, having
regard to the context in which the expression was made and the entirety of
the relevant communication. An expression may relate to more than one
matter. If one of those matters is a “matter of public interest”, the defendant
will have met its onus under s. 137.1(3).
 In focusing on the merits of the allegation of defamation,
the manner of expression and the motives of the author, the
motion judge committed an extricable error of law displacing the
deference otherwise due to her conclusion. While the motion
judge found that the appellant had launched a defamatory personal attack, his motive for the tweets is a matter distinct from
the subject matter of the tweets.
 The appellant’s tweets, when taken as a whole and in context, are about the legitimacy of the respondent’s fundraising
campaign, the benefits which should properly flow to victims of
the Fort McMurray forest fires from charitable contributions and
the treatment of donor contributions. These indisputably relate
to a matter of public interest.
(2) Were there grounds to believe that the appellant had no
valid defence in the proceedings?
 The respondent satisfied the motion judge that there were
grounds to believe that the appellant had no valid defences. The
appellant had advanced the defences of fair comment and failure
to provide notice pursuant to s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act