in the video in order to calculate various distances. It is at best
uncertain whether this lies within the expertise of a physicist.
It is all the more so when the conclusions are drawn without
any knowledge of the operation of the cameras, the angles at
which they were positioned, the distance of the objects from the
cameras, the two-dimensional nature of the images and so on.
 The proposed evidence also fails at the gatekeeping stage
of the analysis. Dressed up in scientific language and awash in
a sea of mathematical formulae and calculations, its potential
effect on a trier of fact far outstripped its probative value. It also
tended to divert the jury’s attention from their obligation to
decide the controverted issue of identification on a single piece of
evidence, about which the witness acknowledged uncertainty,
rather than as the jury’s obligation — the whole of the evidence.
The witness had no way of knowing whether the medallion was
stationary during the 0.133 second interval, or whether it had
moved up and back down in that time.
 I would reject this ground of appeal.
Ground #2: The Defence of Provocation
 This ground of appeal alleges error in the failure of the
trial judge to instruct the jury on the statutory partial defence of
provocation and thus a verdict of manslaughter on this basis.2
Some further background will situate this claim of error in its
The additional background
 The defence advanced at trial, unsupported by the appel-
lant’s testimony or any other defence evidence, was a simple
denial: “I am not the man”.
 In support of his defence, the appellant pointed to several
shortcomings in the Crown’s case. He argued that the cumulative
effect of the evidence adduced fell far short of the exacting standard of proof required in criminal cases. The videos were of poor
quality, themselves incapable of establishing the appellant as the
shooter. Their poor quality diminished the probative value of
the evidence of Det. Idsinga, making it unsafe to rely upon it. The
DNA evidence was unpersuasive in light of the appellant’s admission that he was at Whispers, given that there were other ways
that the DNA could have transferred to Grant’s jacket, including
that the appellant had been searched by Grant on entry.
2 The trial judge did instruct the jury on the availability of a manslaughter
verdict based on inadequate proof of the fault element in murder.