The appellant says that Grant’s conduct was a wrongful act,
an assault of the shooter. This act was of sufficient gravity that it
could deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control.
 Further, the appellant continues, Grant’s wrongful act was
spontaneous, not responsive to any physical contact by the
shooter. The conduct was sudden, the shooter’s response equally
so. Grant’s conduct and the shooter’s immediate response afford
evidence on the subjective element of provocation, in particular,
the suddenness that must characterize both the wrongful act and
the shooter’s response.
 The appellant adds that even if the surveillance videos are
characterized as circumstantial rather than direct evidence, the
air of reality threshold to require submission of provocation to
the jury has been met. Considered as a whole, the evidence would
leave it open to a reasonable jury to draw the inferences necessary to have a reasonable doubt whether the appellant was acting
under provocation when he murdered the deceased.
 The respondent contends otherwise. The evidence adduced
at trial did not, indeed could not, satisfy the air of reality threshold
to warrant submission of the statutory partial defence of provocation and its verdict consequence — manslaughter — to the jury.
 The respondent characterizes the evidentiary foundation
proposed to satisfy the air of reality threshold as consisting entirely of circumstantial evidence. As a result, the totality of this
evidence must be reasonably capable of supporting the inferences
necessary to raise a reasonable doubt about provocation. This
means that the evidence must be reasonably capable of sustaining
the essential inferences on both the objective and subjective elements of provocation.
 The objective and subjective elements of provocation, the
respondent reminds us, each include two components. The objective element includes a wrongful act or insult, which must be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control. The
subjective element requires not only that an accused respond to the
wrongful act (as opposed to something else), but also that he do so
on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool.
 The respondent says that the instigating conduct, the
wrongful act or insult in former s. 232(2) [of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46], must be spontaneous and unforeseeable, not
a predictable response to conduct of the person who seeks to rely
on provocation. And it must make a significant impact on the
person provoked, because it must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control. The conduct must be
considered in the context in which it occurred, not extracted from
its surroundings and considered in splendid isolation.