The “ordinary person” is a legal concept, usually assimilated to the “reasonable person”. It reflects the normative dimensions of the defence. In other words, behaviour which comports
with contemporary society’s norms and values worthy of the
law’s compassion. That said, the “ordinary person” does take into
account some, but not all, of the individual characteristics of the
accused: Tran, at paras. 30-34; Cairney, at para. 37; R. v. Thibert,
 1 S.C.R. 37,  S.C.J. No. 2, at paras. 14, 23.
 The subjective element requires that the accused must have
( i) acted in response to the wrongful act or insult (the provoca-
( ii) acted on the sudden before there was time for his or her pas-
sion to cool.
See Tran, at para. 36; Cairney, at para. 34; R. v. Pappas, 
3 S.C.R. 452,  S.C.J. No. 56, 2013 SCC 56, at para. 34.
 The wrongful act or insult must be sudden, in the sense
that it strikes on the mind of an accused who was unprepared for
it. Likewise, the response of the accused to the sudden provocation must be equally sudden. In other words, suddenness must
characterize both the provocation and the accused’s response or
reaction to it: Cairney, at para. 43; Pappas, at para. 35; R. v. Tripodi,  S.C.R. 438,  S.C.J. No. 29, at p. 443 S.C.R.
 A final point concerns the availability of provocation where
the evidence tends to show that an accused was prepared for an
insult or initiated a confrontation and received a predictable
response which he later asserts amounted to a wrongful act. No
absolute rule forecloses the availability of provocation in those
circumstances. But such a result may usually follow because of
the application of appropriate contextual factors to the question
of whether an ordinary person would have lost the power of self-control: Cairney, at para. 45.
 The air of reality standard determines whether a defence
need be left to the jury for its consideration. Its purpose is not
to assess whether the defence is likely, somewhat likely, or very
likely to succeed as a matter of fact at the end of the trial. Rather,
it seeks to ensure that only those defences with a sound foundation are considered by the trier of fact: R. v. Cinous, 
2 S.C.R. 3,  S.C.J. No. 28, 2002 SCC 29, at paras. 53-54.
 In general terms, the question is whether a properly
instructed jury, acting reasonably, could have a reasonable doubt
about whether the essential elements of a defence are made out.
The test is whether there is evidence upon which a properly
instructed jury acting reasonably could draw the inferences